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CONSUMER FINANCE ACT
FLORIDA'S NEW CONSUMER FINANCE ACT, OR,
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO "SMALL" LOAN LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. General History'
Throughout history the charging of high interest has been con-
demned. As early as the twenty-fourth century B.C. the Laws of Manu
in India established maximum rates of interest.2 The Babylonians,
Greeks and Romans likewise wrestled with the problem of the usurer.?
The Bible, at one extreme, condemned the charge of any interest.4 By
the sixteenth century credit had come into wide use, but was subject to
maximum limits. 5 The historical restrictions are still with us in some
form, and today all but two states have general limits to the amount of
interest that may be contracted for.6 As the demand for consumer and
commercial credit grew, both legal and illegal schemes to satisfy the
demand and to avoid restrictive laws flourished.
0 Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A., University of Nebraska,
1965, J.D., 1968.
The assistance in the preparation of this article of Mr. Robert A. Pierce is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 15-82 (1965); Collins, Eva-
sion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 54 (1941); Dellmuth, Banking's
Opportunity to Service the Small Loan Needs of the Public, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 115
(1954); Gisler, Organization of Public Opinion for Effective Measures Against Loan Sharks,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 183 (1941); Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, 8
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1941); Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of
Consumer Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 4 (1954); Hubachek, The Development of
Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1941); Kelly, Legal Tech-
niques for Combatting Loan Sharks, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 88 (1941); Kilgore, Legisla-
tive Tactics of Unregulated Lenders, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (1941); Nugent, The
Loan-Shark Problem, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1941); Redfield, The Responsibility of
All Consumer Lending Agencies To Help Eliminate the Loan Shark Evil, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 104 (1954); Smith, What Lies Ahead in the Field of Small Loans, 19
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 120 (1954).
2. The Hindu Institute of Manu established a ceiling of 24%. S. HOMER, A HISTORY
OF INTEREST RATES 22-23 (1963), as cited in NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CON-
SUMER CREDrr IN THE UNITED STATES 91 n.4 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE U.S.].
3. Babylonia's maximum rates were between 20% and 33 1/3%, depending on the
type of commodity loaned. Rome's maximum rate varied from 4 116% to 12 1/2%.
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 91-92. Athenians fixed the maximum rate at 12%. See generally
Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1941).
4. In Biblical references, usury was any exacting of interest as opposed to mere ex-
cessive rates of interest. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 23:19-20; Leviticus 25:35-37; Nehemiah
5:10.
5. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 91.
6. Massachusetts and New Hampshire have no general limits to the amount of in-
terest which may be contracted for. I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ff 510 (1973). These
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The illegal loan shark provided short term, low sum loans when
conventional money lenders would not.7 The shark, for the most part,
was not affected by usury laws because the borrower was often unaware
of his rights and was easily harassed into conceding to his "obligation."
Even when actions did come to court, legal defenses were hard to prove
and the available affirmative remedies were most often civil in nature
and required legal counsel, which the debtor usually could not afford.'
Early attempts to control the extraction of high interest rates were
ineffective primarily because the methods used to describe and to limit
the maximum charges were easily avoided by discounts, deductions,
fees and special charges.9 Finally, in 1907, the Russell Sage Foundation
undertook a study of the loan sharking problem.10 This study recog-
nized the need for small loans to wage earners, and by 1916 the founda-
tion had promulgated and recommended a uniform law. This model
established state administrative regulation of small loans and provided
a rate of interest lower than that of loan sharks, yet sufficiently high to
provide an adequate return for the licensed lender. The model law,
which became the Uniform Small Loan Act, has been revised several
times, and today every state has some type of consumer loan legisla-
tion,11 most of which was directly influenced by the Uniform Act.
B. Florida Small Loan Law
In 1925 the first Small Loan Act was passed in Florida, in recogni-
tion of the need for regulation of small loans and in response to the
"Loan Sharking evil." 12 The Act basically followed the plan of the Uni-
form Small Loan Act, but the Florida Legislature limited its applica-
states do, however, have loan laws that regulate specific segments of the market. Id. at
1 540. See also Foldessy & Phelps, Hitting the Ceiling, Wall Street Jour.. Aug. 24, 1973, at
1, coL 6.
7. See, e.g., Redfield, The Responsibility of All Consumer Lending Agencies To Help
Eliminate the Loan Shark Evil, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 104, 105 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Kelly, Legal Techniques For Combatting Loan Sharks, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRon. 88, 90 (1941).
9. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 LAw & Co TEmp.
PROB. 108, 111 (1941).
10. The foundation was created for the "improvement of social and living conditions
in the United States." Ms. Russell Sage endowed the foundation with $15,000,000 to carry
out its work. In promulgating the Uniform Small Loan Law the Department of Consumer
Credit Studies studied the practices of high rate lenders and the effects of state regulation
upon them. Gisler, Organization of Public Opinion for EbFective Measures Against Loan
Sharks, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 184-85 (1941).
11. 1 CCH CONSUMER CRurr GUIDE ff 540 (1971).
12. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10177. The preamble stated that "it is desired to suppress the
'Loan Shark' evil, by authorizing and regulating the conduct of the business of making
small loans, upon fair and lawful terms thereby, inducing reputable money-lenders to ob-
tain State licenses."
[Vol. 1:373
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tion to counties having a population of over forty thousand' s and ex-
cluded the limitations on wage buying.' 4
These weaknesses of the Small Loan Act were eliminated by amend-
ment in 194115 after a vicious battle between the organized, syndicated
unlicensed lenders and the advocates of effective small loan legislation.
The unlicensed lenders lobbied to weaken the small loan law forces by
directing charges of legalized loan sharking and through the use of
scandal sheets.' 6 At this time the small loan lobby was small and lacked
the funds to encourage expansion of the coverage of the Act; the lobby
also suffered from an unfavorable public image and a general fear of
repeal of existing legislation. 17
After the 1941 amendments were enacted the Act remained basically
the same' s until the 1973 legislative session, except for an increase in
the maximum allowable loan'9 and a change in the rate of interest
that may be extracted. 20
The most recent revisions of the Florida Small Loan Law began
13. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10177, § 19. The population limitation encouraged the loan
shark to operate in the less populous areas where enforcement of usury laws would seem-
ingly be lax and where legitimate sources of loans would be scarce.
14. Section 16 of the Uniform Small Loan Act was left out of the Florida Act. The
wage buying technique, which offered a way to extract high rates of interest without
violating loan laws, evolved as the result of delayed payments of earned wages by large
employers, especially in the Southern states. The delayed payment created a chose in
action which could then easily be discounted and not fall within the confines of the Flor-
ida Act. The inability of the employee to forfeit his whole pay check to the wage buyer
resulted in perpetual indebtedness and a disguised small loan business at rates far above
the interest authorized by the Small Loan Act. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory
Small Loan Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 108, 121 (1941).
15. The population limitation was excluded by Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20728, § 6. The
inclusion of wage buying within the sphere of the Small Loan Act was accomplished by
Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20209. This law stated:
[T]he laws of the State relating to the regulation of the business of lending money
and to interest charges and usury are being evaded . . . by the guise of purchasing
the wages [and] salaries . . . at discounts far exceeding the rates of interest per-
mitted by law . . . [and] such transactions in substance and effect amount to loans
for all practical purposes and the evil of such exorbitant discounts is equivalent to
the evil of usurious interest charges ....
16. Kilgore, Legislative Tactics of Unregulated Lenders, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173,
174 (1941).
17. Id. "[A] moral stigma attached to any small loan and to both parties to it. As
for the lender, the public did not know the difference between licensed lender and loan
shark .... As for the borrower, public opinion generally condemned any borrowing by
him as immoral." Smith, What Lies Ahead in the Field of Small Loans, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 120, 121 (1954).
18. Most modifications of the original Act have dealt with licensing and investigating
procedures. See Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201; Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 24869; Fla. Laws 1941, ch.
20728.
19. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201, § 9.
20. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201, § 10.
Florida State University Law Review
on April 24, 1973, when Senate Bill 835 was introduced and referred
to the Commerce and the Ways and Means Committees.2 1 After a
hearing in the Commerce Committee, a committee substitute was
proposed. The bill, having been withdrawn from the Ways and Means
Committee, was forwarded to the Senate floor where several additional
amendments were incorporated. 22 The committee substitute as amended
was passed by the full Senate by a 28 to 7 vote.2 The bill was then
referred to the House of Representatives where it was received and
referred to the Finance and Taxation Committee.24 In the meantime,
a companion measure to the original Senate bill, House Bill 1775, was
considered by the House Business Regulation Committee, where it
was substantially amended. After being forwarded by Business Regula-
tion, House Bill 1775 was referred to the Finance and Taxation Com-
mittee where it became the basis for further amendments to Senate
Bill 835. The committee then reported it to the House where it was
placed on the calendar. After much discussion and many amendments,
on May 23, 1973, the House passed the amended bill by a 90 to 20
vote.
25
Before becoming law the bill went back to the Senate for approval
of the House amendments which in turn were further amended,26
again to the House for amending and approval of the Senate's amend-
ments, 27 and finally back to the Senate for concurrence. 28 On June 1
the bill was finally forwarded to the Governor's office where it became
law without his signature.2 9
C. Florida Consumer Finance Law
In 1949 the Florida Consumer Finance Law was passed,30 creating
a dual system of small loan laws in Florida. The Consumer Finance
Law was almost identical to the original Small Loan Act except for
the method utilized to compute interest and chargesA1 The effective
interest rate which could be charged under the Consumer Finance Law,
however, was several percent less than that authorized by the Small
21. FLA. S. JOUR. 245 (1973).
22. The various versions and the proposed amendments will be discussed in the ap-
propriate sections infra.
23. FLA. S. Jou&. 417 (1973).
24. FLA. H.R. Jou . 616 (1973).
25. FLA. H.R. jout 783 (1973).
26. FLA. S. JouR. 528 (1973).
27. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 813-15 (1973).
28. FLA. S. JOUR. 569 (1973).
29. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 16.
30. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25343.
31. See pp. 379-87 infra.
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Loan Law. 2 When both acts were amended in 1957, some of the dis-
crepancy was eliminated. 33
The reasons for enacting the parallel provisions can only be sur-
mised since the "declaration of legislative intent" gives little assist-
ance. 4 By viewing the list of registrants under the Consumer Finance
Law88 one notes large numbers of national companies and is led to
speculate that the legislation was enacted as a convenience to those
companies, who might wish to state and compute interest in ways not
authorized by the original Small Loan Act.
With the 1973 amendments, Florida again has only one Small Loan
Act. The 1949 Consumer Finance Law has been repealeds" and reg-
istrants thereunder will be converted to licensees under the amended
Small Loan Act.8 7 The new, all inclusive Act is named the "Florida
Consumer Finance Act."8
To avoid confusion, the newly amended Act will be referred to as
the Consumer Finance Act (CFA);39 the unamended Act, in effect until
the 1973 amendments become law, will be referred to as the Small
Loan Act (SLA); the former Consumer Finance Law which was orig-
inally enacted in 1949 will be referred to as chapter 519.
II. FINANCE CHARGE AND PRINCIPAL AMOUNT
A. Explanation
"The representations with reference to charges now being made by
banks, discount companies, and sales finance companies constitute a
veritable babble of tongues. '" 4 ° The Florida small loan situation is no
different. The SLA provided that its licensees
32. Compare FLA. STAT. § 519.08 (1949), with FLA. STAT. § 516.14 (1949).
33. Compare FLA. STAT. § 519.08 (1957), with FLA. STAT. § 516.14 (1957).
34. The legislative intent is set forth in the statute:
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this law to create the business of dis-
count consumer credit financing with respect to the business of making certain
loans, and to bring under effective supervision those engaged in the business of dis-
count and installment loans, to establish a system of regulation for the purpose of
insuring honest and efficient finance service, to fix reasonable charges for borrowers,
to permit a fair return, and to provide the administration necessary for effective
enforcement.
FLA. STAT. § 519.02 (1971).
35. COMPTROLLER OF FLORIDA, DISCOUNT CONSUMER FINANCING AND SMALL LOAN AN-
NUAL REPORTS (1972) [hereinafter referred to as ANNUAL REPORTS].
36. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 15.
37. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.34).
38. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 1.
39. The effective date of the Act is October 1, 1973.
40. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 108, 132 (1941).
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may charge, contract for and receive thereon interest at a rate not to
exceed three percent per month on that part of the unpaid principal
balance not exceeding three hundred dollars and two percent per
month on that part of the unpaid balance in excess of three hundred
dollars but not exceeding six hundred dollars, provided that at the
expiration of a period of twelve months following the last contractual
installment date the interest on any balance still unpaid shall not
exceed ten percent per year. Interest shall not be payable in advance
or compounded and shall be computed on unpaid balances on the
basis of the number of days actually elapsed and, for the purpose of
such computations, a month shall be any period of thirty consecutive
days. 4 1
Chapter 519 was even less clear. Registrants thereunder could collect
[a]n initial charge in an amount not exceeding ten dollars per one
hundred dollars of the amount of the loan, repayable over a period
of one year, and proportionately at that rate for a greater or lesser
sum or for a longer or shorter period, which charge may be computed
on the amount of the loan from date thereof until date of maturity
of the final installment notwithstanding any agreement to pay the
loan obligation in installments, such charge to be added to the
amount of the loan at the time it is made, and two dollars on each
ten dollars of this charge shall constitute, in whole or in part, reim-
bursement of expenses incurred and compensation for services ren-
dered in connection with the making of the loan and the remainder
of the initial charge shall be interest .... 42
Chapter 519 registrants could collect, in addition,
[a] monthly service charge, to cover services rendered and expenses
incurred in connection with the loan transaction, [which] may be
contracted for and collected until the loan is fully paid for each
month, and the fraction of a month at the end of the loan, provided
such charge shall not be in excess of twenty cents for each full twenty-
five dollars of the original loan obligation and not in excess of two
dollars and forty cents per month. Such service charge shall not be
collected at the time the loan is made, provided, however, the service
charge covering the number of monthly payments required by the
loan contract may be aggregated and included in the face amount
of the loan obligation. 3
41. FLA. STAT. § 516.14(1) (1971). The highest rate of interest that could be charged
for twelve thirty-day months, or a 360-day year, was 36%. For a calendar year of 365 days
the rate would be about 36.5%.
42. FLA. STAT. § 519.08(1) (1971).
43. FLA. STAT. § 519.08(2) (1971).
[V/ol. 1:373
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Thus, for a $300 loan, the charge, consisting of "interest," "reimburse-
ment of expenses incurred and compensation for services rendered"
and "monthly service charge," was approximately 341/2%.
Even with the combination of the SLA and chapter 519 into the
CFA, clarity did not completely prevail.
The licensee may charge, contract for, and receive thereon, interest
charges as provided and authorized by this section. The maximum
interest rate shall be thirty percent (30%) per one hundred dollars
($100.00) per annum computed on the first three hundred dollars
($300.00) of the principal amount as computed from time to time,
twenty-four percent (24%) per one hundred dollars ($100.00) per
annum on that part of the principal amount as computed from time
to time exceeding three hundred dollars ($300.00) and sixteen per-
cent (16%) per one hundred dollars ($100.00) per annum on that part
of the principal amount as computed from time to time exceeding
six hundred dollars ($600.00). The original principal amount as used
in this section shall be the same amount as the amount financed as
defined by the federal truth-in-lending act and regulation Z of the
board of governors of the federal reserve system. In determining
compliance with the statutory maximum interest and finance charges
set forth herein, the computations utilized shall be simple interest,
and not add-on interest or any other computations.
4
"
Several additional provisions add to the confusion: one excludes "other
charges" except certain fees;45 one46 ties the finance charge that may be
44. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(1)).
45. The "other charges" exclusion provides:
In addition to the interest and insurance charges . . . provided for, no further
or other charges or amount whatsoever for any examination, service, brokerage, com-
mission or other thing or otherwise shall be directly or indirectly charged, con-
tracted for or received, except the documentary excise tax and lawful fees, if any,
actually and necessarily paid out by the licensee to any public officer for filing or
recording or releasing in any public office, any instrument securing the loan, which
fees may be collected when the loan is made or at any time thereafter, or actual
and reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court in which suit is filed and
court costs, including actual and reasonable expenses of repossession, storing and
selling of any property pledged as security, as determined by the court in which
suit is filed.
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(5)).
46. The provision states:
The annual percentage rate of finance charge which may be contracted for and re-
ceived under any loan contract made by a licensee under this chapter may equal but
may not exceed the annual percentage rate which must be computed and disclosed
as required by the federal truth-in-lending act and regulation Z of the board of
governors of the federal reserve system. The maximum annual percentage rate of
finance charge which may be contracted for and received is twelve (12) times the
maximum monthly rate and the maximum annual rate shall be computed on the
1973]
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contracted for to the provisions of the Federal Truth in Lending Act47
and Regulation Z;' s another defines interest as including any "profit or
advantage" received by the licensee with the exception of insurance
commissions.49 Finally, there are provisions in the CFA50 and the in-
surance code5l which exempt credit life and disability insurance from
the "interest" charge.
The CFA rate section, read in the light of the other cited pro-
visions, seems to have the following meanings:
(1) The "finance charge" that may be collected under the CFA
shall not exceed the finance charge that is required to be disclosed
under Truth in Lending.
(2) Since "finance charge" is not defined under the CFA, the use
of that term to describe charges under the CFA requires the same
meaning as when using the term "finance charge" to describe charges
to be disclosed under Truth in Lending.
(3) Under Truth in Lending, "finance charge" is defined as fol-
lows: 2
(a) ... Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of
the finance charge in connection with any consumer credit transaction
basis of one-twelfth (1/ 12) of the annual rate for each full month. The department
shall by regulation establish the rate for each day in a fraction of a month when the
period for which the charge is computed is more or less than one (1) month.
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(4)).
47. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as CCPA, with corresponding U.S. Code section].
48. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as
Reg. Z].
49. This provision states:
Any profit or advantage of any kind whatsoever that any licensee may contract
for, collect, receive or in anywise obtain by a collateral sale, purchase, or agreement,
in connection with any loan regulated by this chapter shall be deemed to be interest
or consideration for the purposes of regulation under this chapter. Such transactions
shall be governed by and subject to the provisions of this chapter, except commis-
sions received as a person licensed by the department of insurance on insurance
written as hereinafter permitted, shall be deemed to be interest or consideration for
the purposes of regulation under this chapter. However, security consisting of
tangible property offered as security may be reasonably insured against loss for a
reasonable term, considering the circumstances of the loan, and such insurance
shall not be deemed such collateral sale, purchase, or agreement when the policy
is payable to the borrower or any member of his family, even though the customary
mortgagee clause is attached or the licensee is a coassured; provided, that such in-
surance is sold at standard rates through a person duly licensed by the department
of insurance.
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 10 (§ 516.20(1)).
50. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.35).
51. FLA. STAT. § 627.684 (1971).
52. CCPA § 1605. Sections 1605(b) and (c) have been omitted here but will be dis-
cussed in section V infra.
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shall be determined as the sum of all charges, payable directly or in-
directly by the person to whom the credit is extended, and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension
of credit, including any of the following types of charges which are
applicable:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable
under a point, discount, or other system of additional charges.
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance pro-
tecting the creditor against the obligor's default or other credit
loss.
(d) ... If any of the following items is itemized and disclosed in ac-
cordance with the regulations of the Board in connection with any
transaction, then the creditor need not include that item in the
computation of the finance charge with respect to that transaction:
(1) Fees and charges prescribed by law which actually are or will
be paid to public officials for determining the existence of or for
perfecting or releasing or satisfying any security related to the
credit transaction.
(2) The premium payable for any insurance in lieu of perfecting
any security interest otherwise required by the creditor in connec-
tion with the transaction, if the premium does not exceed the fees
and charges described in paragraph (1) which would otherwise be
payable.
(3) Taxes.
(4) Any other type of charge which is not for credit and the ex-
clusion of which from the finance charge is approved by the Board
by regulation.
Thus "finance charge" includes not only "interest" but some "other
charges" to the debtor as well.
(4) "Other charges" which are to be included within the "finance
charge," e.g., investigation, brokerage or service fees, cannot, under the
CFA, be charged to the debtor (with the exception of insurance)5 s if
the maximum "interest" charge has already been assessed ."
(5) Items which may be excluded from the "finance charge" if
separately itemized and disclosed, may, under the CFA, be charged to
the debtor in addition to interest and insurance charges. 55
53. The provisions on insurance will be discussed in section V infra.
54. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(5)).
55. Id.
1973]
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(6) To compute the maximum allowable "interest" charge, the
"principal amount" upon which the charge is computed shall equal the
"amount financed" under Truth in Lending.
(7) The "amount financed" is "[t]he amount of credit . . . which
will be paid to the customer or for his account or to another person on
his behalf, including all charges, individually itemized, which are in-
cluded in the amount of credit extended but which are not part of the
finance charge... "56
(8) The "other charges," which may be charged under the CFA,
must be added to the "principal amount" when determining the maxi-
mum allowable "interest charge. '57
(9) The language "the computations utilized shall be simple in-
terest and not add-on interest or any other computations" means the
same as "annual percentage rate" (APR) under Truth in Lending,
which is defined as
that nominal annual percentage rate which will yield a sum equal
to the amount of the finance charge when it is applied to the unpaid
balances of the amount financed, calculated according to the actuarial
method of allocating payments made on a debt between the amount
financed and the amount of the finance charge, pursuant to which a
payment is applied first to the accumulated finance charge and the
balance is applied to the unpaid amount financed .... 15
Illustration I charts the operation of this method on a $300 loan
at 30% "simple interest" or APR to be repaid in equal monthly in-
stallments over a term of twelve months.
Unlike the SLA 59 or chapter 519,60 the CFA does not clearly specify
a method which must be followed by the licensees in setting up their
consumer accounts. The two common possibilities are the outstanding
balance method and the precomputation method. In the former, a
ledger card is kept and each time a payment is made, the payment is
divided between interest (computed on the outstanding principal
balance) and principal; i.e., the ledger card would look very similar to
56. Reg. Z, § 226.8(d)(I).
57. The following costs would not be part of the credit extended and would thus be
neither part of the "finance charge" nor part of the "amount financed": "actual and
reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court in which suit is filed and court costs,
including actual and reasonable expenses of repossession, storing and selling of any prop-
erty pledged as security, as determined by the court in which suit is filed." Fla. Laws 1973,
ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(5)).
58. CCPA § 1606(a)(l)(A).
59. FLA. STAT. § 516.14 (1971) (outstanding balances).
60. FLA. STAT. § 519.08 (1971) (precomputed).
[Vol. 1:373
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ILLUSTRATION I
Month Unpaid Balances Outstanding
During Month
1 $300.00
2 278.25
3 255.95
4 233.10
5 209.68
6 185.67
7 161.06
8 135.84
9 109.99
10 83.49
11 56.33
12 28.49*
* The $.05 difference is occasioned
tions out to more than 2 decimal place
Application of $29.25
Monthly Payments
Charges
7.50
6.96
6.40
5.83
5.24
4.64
4.03
3.40
2.75
2.09
1.41
.71
Principal
21.75
22.30
22.85
23.42
24.01
24.61
25.22
25.85
26.50
27.16
27.84
28.54*
by the failure to carry the computa-
Illustration I. If using the precomputation method the consumer
debtor's ledger would show one balance which includes precomputed
interest charges and principal. Each time a payment is made, it is de-
ducted from the balance. The balance then indicates the total remain-
ing indebtedness if the obligation is paid according to schedule.
Although it could be argued that the CFA language, "as computed
from time to time" and "simple interest, and not add-on interest or any
other computations," would specify the outstanding balance method, it
could just as ably be argued that the quoted language is merely to
safeguard the way the "interest" is to be computed for rate regulation
purposes and not how the ledgers are going to be set up. In fact, the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) provides:
[The rate] section does not limit or restrict the manner of contracting
for the credit service charge, whether by way of add-on, discount, or
otherwise, so long as the rate of the credit service charge does not ex-
ceed that permitted by this section.61
The Department of Banking and Finance (hereinafter referred to as
the Department) has settled the argument by requiring, by regulation,
61. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § Z.201(3) (1968) [hereinafter referred to as
ucccl.
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that the outstanding balance method be utilized.62 Although the CFA
does not seem to mandate such a rule, for the sake of uniformity it is
probably a wise one.6 3
B. Rates and Principal Amounts
The CFA increased the size of loans that licensees could offer at
rates above the general usury limitation, but it lowered the maximum
permissible interest. The following chart compares the various annual
percentage rates under prior law and the CFA.
ILLUSTRATION II
$0-300 $300-600" $600-2500"*
SLA 36.5% 24.33% 10% * *
Ch. 519 34.5% 18% 10%**
CFA 30% 24% 16%
* Maximum principal under SLA and ch. 519.
* # Maximum principal under CFA.
# General usury rate under Florida Statutes ch. 687.
The arguments for the increased loan limits were numerous and
varied; the most frequent and perhaps emotional argument suggested
that under the old law a customer who needed a $1200 or an $1800
loan would have to go to several finance companies, borrowing $600
or less at each at the maximum rates, which in most cases would mean
that his loan would cost him at least 30%. If the Act were amended to
allow a company to loan him the full amount, the loan could be ex-
tended at reduced rates because it costs nearly as much to administer a
$600 loan as it does an $1800 loan, administrative costs constituting a
large portion of the expenses that finance companies are subjected to.64
This "need" for higher limits is further amplified by the inflationary
trend that not only has caused the relative worth of $600 to shrink but
also has driven up loan administration costs.65 Nor is the increase in
limits a local phenomenon--only six states are at the $600 limitation
or less, whereas double that number are at $3,000 or more. The most
62. DEPT. OF BANKING AND FINANCE, FLORIDA CONSUMER FINANCE Acr RuLEs ch. 3-2
to 3-2.17 (Aug. 27, 1973) [hereinafter referred to as RULES].
63. It was suggested in 1941 that the statutory schemes should use the all-inclusive
percentage rate applied strictly to the unpaid balances. Hubachek, The Development of
Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 108, 111 (1941).
64. See CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE U.S. 139-45.
65. Several of these arguments were already being made in 1954. See Hubachek, Prog-
ress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 LAw & CoNTFmp. PROB. 4, 14-16
(1954).
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popular range is from $1,000 to $3,000, with a $2,500 limit being the
most common. 66
As a tradeoff to obtain these higher loan limits, the finance com-
panies were subjected to a lowering of the permissible finance charges67
and were deprived of the advantages of several remedies and collection
devices which they had possessed. 8 Both these changes have a direct
and constricting influence on the gross income of the finance companies,
but this loss in income can be offset by increasing the average loan
size. This increase in loan size will decrease the percentage of income
which is needed for administration. If it costs $25 to administer a loan,
whether it be for $500 or $1000, the administration cost per dollar
loaned for the $500 loan would be double that for the $1000 loan.69
Likewise, companies can offset these increased costs by reducing their
bad debt losses. The surest way to reduce the percentage of bad debts
is to decrease the average credit risk of the borrowers. This would be
done by denying loans to those borrowers who are marginal credit risks.
The result of these changes is going to be highly advantageous to
relatively low risk borrowers, but to the marginal credit risk it is bound
to have detrimental effects. Either he is going to be forced to borrow
more money than he really needs so that loan costs can be recouped, or
he will be denied credit in the legal market.70 Either result seems to
frustrate the very intent of the original small loan acts, which was to
give necessitous borrowers a legal source of short term, low principal
loans.7'
III. PAYMENT SCHEDULE DURATION
A further limitation on licensees and borrowers is the restriction on
the duration of payment schedules. All three of the acts, the SLA,72
chapter 51973 and the CFA,74 contain such restrictions. If the duration
66. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 540 (1970).
67. See Illustration II supra.
68. See discussion of consumer protection in section VIII infra.
69. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 139-45.
70. Id. at 109-49. It is interesting to note in the range of smallest loans, $300 or less,
where the administrative costs per dollar loaned are the greatest, the legislature made the
greatest cuts in rate. At the other end of the spectrum, where the loans are the largest
and the costs per dollar loaned are the least, there were either small rate decreases or an
increase.
71. The National Commission on Consumer Finance suggests economic justification
for rates as high as 94.66% on a $100 loan and as low as 13.98% on a $3,000 loan. Id. at
141-45. Texas has made special provision for loans under $100. TERX. Rxv. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-3.16 (1971).
72. FLA. STAT. § 516.20(2) (1971).
73. FLA. STAT. § 519.10(2) (1971).
74. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 10 (§ 516.20(2)).
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of the repayment schedule is too long, the debtor will be misled by the
smallness of the payments and will be saddled with low payment and
high total interest charges over a long period of time. If, on the other
hand, the duration is too limited, the payments necessary to pay off the
loan will be so high as to realistically put the loan out of reach of many
necessitous borrowers.
The CFA provides:
No licensee shall enter into any contract for a loan under this chapter
for six hundred dollars ($600.00) or less which provides for scheduled
repayment of principal more than twenty four (24) months and
fifteen (15) days from the date the loan is made, nor enter into any
contract for a loan under this chapter for more than six hundred
dollars ($600.00) which provides for scheduled repayment of prin-
cipal more than thirty six (36) months and fifteen (15) days from the
date the loan is made.75
The twenty-four month limitation for $600 or less is basically the same
as prevailed under the SLA and chapter 519, and has seemed to work
quite well. But the thirty-six month limitation may prove to be too
short and thus act as a restriction on the availability of credit. For ex-
ample, a maximum loan of $600 at the maximum CFA rates may be
paid back in twenty-four monthly installments of about $35 per month;
but a $2,500 loan at maximum CFA rates must be paid back in thirty-
six months with payments of about $93.
This provision also creates an interesting problem of interpretation
which is raised by the following hypothetical:
Debtor borrows $2,500 and is charged the maximum legal rate of
interest, 30%, 24% and 16%. His payment schedule is set up for
the maximum thirty-six months and fifteen days. Because of his slow
payments, there is unpaid principal due at the end of the thirty-six
months. Six months after the final installment was due, Debtor de-
cides to pay his account in full. What rate of interest can be charged
for the six month period?
There is nothing in the Act which authorizes over 10% to be
charged beyond the thirty-six month limitation. In fact, it provides:
No person shall engage in the business of making loans of money,
credit, goods or choses in action in the amount, or to the value of two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) or less, and charge, con-
tract for, or receive a greater rate of interest than ten percent (10%)
75. Id.
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per annum therefor, except as authorized by this chapter and without
first obtaining a license from the department, or except as authorized
by other statute of this state.76
Thus the inevitable conclusion is that the creditor is limited to the
general usury rate of 10% if the debtor does not pay according to
schedule and drags out payments beyond the statutory maximum dura-
tion.
Similar statutory language in the SLA was construed by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1956; the court concluded that the higher SLA rate
could not extend beyond the statutory duration limit.77 In 1957, the
Florida Legislature amended the SLA rate section to provide in part
"that at the expiration of a period of twelve months following the last
contractual installment date the interest on any balance still unpaid
shall not exceed ten percent per year." ' This 1957 revision has been
interpreted by the Florida attorney general as qualifying the earlier
supreme court decision.7 9
A plain reading of these statutes lends credence to the position
that the statutory 2%-3% per month interest rate would be lawful
up to 12 months after the last installment date. It is precisely at that
time that the 10% per annum rate is expressly required by legislative
pronouncement. It is difficult to discern any other reason for the
aforementioned language ....
By failing to reenact the language of the 1957 amendment, it must
surely be concluded that the legislature intended that the 30%-24%-
16%/ rate not be utilized beyond the duration limit.
IV. DELINQUENCY CHARGES
A delinquency charge is an additional assessment made on credit
transactions because payment is made later than the due date specified
in the contract or loan agreement. The assessment of a delinquency
charge is justified on the basis that (1) the interest charges were com-
puted on the assumption that installments would be paid according to
contractual schedule; (2) following a "grace period" of five to ten days
after the due date, the creditor must transfer the contract or loan agree-
ment to his collection department, so the charge offsets the cost of
special handling that would otherwise be imposed on all debtors; and
76. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 2 (§ 516.02). See also Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 9
(§ 516.18(1)).
77. Vann v. Accounts Supervision Co., 88 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1956).
78. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201, § 9 (§ 516.14(1)).
79. FLA. Ops. ATT'y GEN. 072-100, at 3 (1972).
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(3) the contract is technically in default at the end of this grace period,
so the delinquency charge is a convenient method of motivating pay-
ment, without the expense of going to court over what may prove to be
a simple oversight on the part of the debtor.
The SLA had no provision for the assessment of delinquency
charges on late payments. Since loans under this Act were not pre-
computed, the debtor was by the terms of the agreement penalized for
any late payment, as a greater portion of that payment would be con-
sumed by accrued interest charges.
Chapter 519 authorized the assessment of delinquency charges fol-
lowing a minimum grace period of five days after the due date.80 The
delinquency charge under this Act could only be assessed one time with
respect to any particular installment, a limitation which prevented one
of the methods of compounding such charges. The amount of the de-
linquency charge under this Act was limited to five cents on each whole
dollar of the amount of the unpaid installment."'
The CFA provides for delinquency fees as follows:
A licensee may, if agreed to in writing, contract for, impose and col-
lect a delinquent charge of five cents ($.05) per dollar for each full
dollar of an installment which is delinquent for ten (10) or more
days, which charge may be imposed only once on each delinquent
installment. A charge under this subsection shall be in lieu of all
other delinquent or deferral charges.82
If the interest is to be precomputed, such charges seem justified to
compensate the licensee for the extra trouble he may be put to and to
charge the debtor for the extra time he has the use of the overdue
payment. If the interest is to be computed on the outstanding balance
at the time of each payment, however, the creditor is already being
compensated for the additional use of this money, so the assessment of
a delinquency charge could be viewed as an extra charge. To remain
consistent with its requirement that interest not be precomputed but
should be determined on the outstanding balances,"s the Department
has promulgated a rule which, in effect, destroys the "bite" of the de-
linquency provisions.
Any charge which a licensee may impose or collect pursuant to [the
80. FLA. STAT. § 519.08(4) (1971).
81. Id.
82. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(2)). UCCC §§ 2.203, 3.203, and the Na-
tional Consumer Act § 2.204 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as NCA] likewise authorize
delinquency charges.
83. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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provisions on delinquency fees] shall for all purposes be considered
interest and shall be subject to the maximum rates provided and
authorized by [the CFA].8'
To prevent the pyramiding of delinquency charges, the CFA pro-
vides that "[p]ayments shall be applied first to current insallments [sic],
then to past-due installments, and then to delinquency charges, if
any."8
5
V. INSURANCE WRITTEN IN CONNECTION WITH CONSUMER
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
The prohibition against extra charges in the small loan law is in
such sweeping terms that it should be construed to prohibit credit
insurance charges, except in a few states where they are specifically
authorized.8 6
Florida is one such state where the licensee, in addition to the
legislatively established interest charges, may obtain additional revenue
through the sale of various forms of credit insurance. 7 The rules re-
garding life and disability insurance vary from those regulating hazard
insurance, so these two classifications will be discussed separately.
A. Casualty Insurances"
The CFA authorizes the licensee to require insurance on security
"consisting of tangible property." Likewise, "commissions received as
a person licensed by the department of insurance on insurance written"
pursuant to such authority shall not be considered "interest."' 9
In addition to the insurance licensing requirements, 0 the seller
of such insurance is subject to the anti-coercion statute which, while
reenforcing the right to require insurance, prohibits the specification
84. RuLs § 3-2.15.
85. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(2)). Without such a provision, if the
debtor pays his contracted installment of $50 twelve days late, the creditor assesses the
delinquency fee of 5% ($2.50); if the debtor pays the next month's payment of $50 on
time but does not pay the $2.50, and the creditor deducts the $2.50 from the $50 payment,
the debtor will again be delinquent on a portion of an installment, and the process re-
peats itself.
86. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 4, 18 (1954).
87. "In addition to the interest and insurance charges herein provided for ... Fla.
Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(5)) (emphasis added).
88. "Casualty insurance" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 624.605 (1971).
89. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 10 (§ 516.20(1)).
90. FLA. STAT. § 626.321 (1971).
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of any particular agent, solicitor or insurer. 1 Thus, the licensee can
require property damage and liability insurance but cannot require
that the insurance be purchased from him or any other particular
source.92
B. Credit Life and Disability Insurance
In continuing the policy of the SLA and chapter 519,9- the CFA
authorizes the licensees thereunder to provide credit life and disability
insurance, subject to the provisions of the insurance code.
Credit life and disability insurance which is provided at the expense
of borrowers must be provided only under a group or individual
insurance policy which complies with sections 627.676 through
627.683 and 627.685, Florida Statutes, and lawful regulations there-
under. The cost of credit life and disability insurance which is
paid by borrowers shall be deducted from the principal amount of
the loan and shall be disclosed on the statement required by section
516.15(1), Florida Statutes, or a combined note and disclosure state-
ment required by federal truth in lending act.94
The provisions of the insurance code authorize the issuance of
special licenses to "an individual employed by or associated with a
lending or financing institution or creditor," but the sale of such in-
surance is authorized "only with respect to borrowers or debtors of
such lending or financing institution or creditor."' 5 The code also pro-
vides:
The premium or cost of credit life or disability insurance, when
written by or through any lender or other creditor, its affiliate or as-
91. FLA. STAT. § 626.960 (1971).
92. The Federal Truth in Lending Act achieves basically the same result by providing
that the premiums
shall be included in the finance charge unless a clear and specific statement in writ-
ing is furnished by the creditor to the person to whom the credit is extended, set-
ting forth the cost of the insurance if obtained from or through the creditor, and
stating that the person to whom the credit is extended may choose the person
through which the insurance is to be obtained.
CCPA § 1605(c).
93. The right of an SLA licensee or chapter 519 registrant to sell life or disability
insurance, in the face of inconsistent statutory provisions in those chapters and the in-
surance code, was established by the case of Dickinson v. Buck, 220 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In the Buck case, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that
he had the statutory right to sell credit life insurance and that the premiums for such
insurance would not be considered part of the finance charge. The court of appeal af-
firmed the lower court's decision that he had such a right; the effect of that decision is
now embodied in FLA. STAT. § 627.684 (1971).
94. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.35).
95. FLA. STAT. § 626.321(1)(e) (1971).
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sociate or subsidiary or a director, officer or employee of any of them
shall not be deemed as interest or charges or consideration or an
amount in excess of permitted charges in connection with the loan
or credit transaction and any gain or advantage to any lender or
other creditor, its affiliate, associate or subsidiary or a director, of-
ficer or employee of any of them, arising out of the premium or
commission or dividend from the sale or provision of such insurance
shall not be deemed a violation of any other law general or special,
civil or criminal of this state, or of any rule, regulation or order
issued by any regulatory authority.96
It could be argued, however, that this provision is not applicable since
it is not expressly included within the insurance references enumerated
in the CFA, 7 but it is doubtful that any court would so hold because
the references have likewise omitted the insurance licensing provisions',
which surely were not intended to be excluded. Futhermore, the
language of the CFA seems to be aimed at merely the form of the policy
and the conditions under which it is to be issued rather than at the
status of the charges therefor.99
Furthermore, the life and disability anti-coercion statute exempts
credit life and disability insurance from its operation, 100 and there is
no other Florida statute prohibiting creditors from conditioning the
granting of credit on the purchase of credit life or disability insurance
from their employee or associate. Thus, in Florida, a small loan licensee
can sell credit life and disability insurance, can require that the debtor
purchase such insurance and can condition the grant of credit on the
purchase of such insurance from an employee or associate of the li-
censee. For this service the licensee can charge premiums in addition to
the authorized "interest" charge.
In the situation where the creditor requires the purchase of in-
surance as a prerequisite to the granting of credit, the CFA may contain
a serious inconsistency. For the purposes of rate regulation, the pre-
mium would be excluded from the "interest" charge; but because of
the tie with Truth in Lending, it would be included in the "finance
charge."'' At this point there is no conflict because the CFA merely
96. FLA. STAT. § 627.684 (1971) (emphasis added).
97. Compare FLA. STAT. § 627.684 (1971), with Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12
(§ 516.35) ("sections 627.676 through 627.683 and 627.685").
98. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 626.321(1)(e) (1971).
99. "Credit life and disability insurance... must be provided only under a group or
individual insurance policy which complies with sections 627.676 through 627.683 and
627.685 ...." Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.35).
100. FLA. STAT. § 626.961 (1971).
101. The CCPA states:
Charges or premiums for credit life, accident, or health insurance written in
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limits the rate of "interest"'1 2 which may be charged and not the
"finance charge," which includes within its definition not only interest
but other charges such as insurance.103 Thus, the rate of "interest" may
be 30%, in compliance with the appropriate provisions of the Act, while
the APR of the "finance charge" may be 31 % or higher. A problem
does arise, however, when one considers the requirement that "[t]he
cost of credit life and disability insurance which is paid by borrowers
shall be deducted from the principal amount of the loan,"104 which
assumes that the premium was part of the principal amount. "Original
principal amount" is to be the same as the "amount financed" under
Truth in Lending.10 5 Yet under Truth in Lending in the questioned
situation, the insurance premium would not be part of the "amount
financed" but would instead be included in the "finance charge."'10 6
The first way to eliminate the conflict is to argue that the legisla-
ture, by implication, prohibited licensees from requiring as an incident
to the granting of credit, purchase of credit life or disability insurance.
This may be a difficult position to take because the insurance code
provisions are unchanged and are even referred to in the statute. The
other possibility is to assert that the terms "principal amount," as used
in the insurance section, and "original principal amount," which is
tied to Truth in Lending, are not synonymous. As used in the in-
surance section, "principal amount" merely evidences the source of
payment of the insurance fees and has nothing to do with the method
of computing rates and charges.
The wisdom, however, of permitting the creditor to require credit
life and disability insurance is frequently questioned and condemned.107
It was contended that credit insurance is necessary and that borrowers
usually want it when offered. Both contentions disregard the fact that
connection with any consumer credit transaction shall be included in the finance
charge unless
(1) the coverage of the debtor by the insurance is not a factor in the approval by
the creditor of the extension of credit, and this fact is clearly disclosed in writing
to the person applying for or obtaining the extension of credit; and
(2) in order to obtain the insurance in connection with the extension of credit, the
person to whom the credit is extended must give specific affirmative written indica-
tion of his desire to do so after written disclosure to him of the cost thereof.
CCPA § 1605(b).
102. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(1)); see p. 381 supra.
103. CCPA § 1605; Note 101 supra.
104. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.35).
105. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(1)); see p. 381 supra.
106. CCPA § 1605; see note 101 supra.
107. See, e.g., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 85-86; Davis, Etter, Blythe & Freund, The
Regulation of Consumer Credit Insurance, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 718 (1968); Huba-
chek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PNoB.
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from 40 percent to over 80 percent of the premium is retained by the
lender, directly or indirectly. Profiting from the sale of credit in-
surance in addition to the charges permitted by the small loan laws
violates the cardinal principle of a single, all-inclusive maximum rate
of charge. It opens the door to manipulations and devices. Whenever
anything has been sold in connection with small loans, abuses have
resulted. Like vitamin pills, life and disability insurance may be good
for borrowers, but licensed lenders should no more be permitted to
profit from tie-in sales of insurance than from tie-in sales of vitamin
pills.108
The evil is further compounded in Florida where the creditor can
legally require the purchase of insurance from himself.
To meet this evil many have suggested that the creditor should not
be permitted to profit from the sale of this coverage. 10 9 Then the mo-
tives behind such sales would be purely those of protecting the "secur-
ity," which in this instance would be the borrower's health and life.
The National Consumer Act (NCA) embodies this principal with
vengeance.
No creditor may receive any fee, commission, or benefit, directly
or indirectly for any insurance provided for the consumer nor may
any creditor provide or agree to provide any insurance for the con-
sumer under a contract of insurance issued by the creditor or by any
insurance carrier related to the creditor.110
The necessity and desirability of such a provision has been ques-
tioned,"' but at the very least, the Florida Legislature should be urged
to include credit life and disability insurance within the anti-coercion
provisions. The next step would seem to be to enact a provision to
mirror the UCCC, which includes the insurance premium within the
regulated finance charge if the creditor requires such insurance.112
VI. PREPAYMENT AND REBATE RIGHTS
Where the interest or finance charge is precomputed for the entire
period of the credit term, the Florida consumer who prepays before
4, 18-21 (1954).
108. Hubachek, supra note 107, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
109. See, e.g., id.; CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 85-86; Shuchman, Consumer Credit
by Adhesion Contracts-lI, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 281, 301-09 (1962).
110. NCA § 4.110(1).
111. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 84-89.
112. UCCC §§ 2.202, 3.202. These provisions would permit the premium charge to
be assessed in addition to the credit service charge (interest) "if the insurance coverage is
not a factor in the approval by the seller of the extension of credit."
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the end of that credit term is normally entitled to a return, refund or
credit for any finance charge which is unearned at the time he satisfied
the credit obligation.113
The SLA required the licensee to "[p]ermit payment of the loan in
whole or in part prior to its maturity with interest on such payment to
the date thereof.""11 ' Since the interest under this Act was computed
only on the outstanding balance and was not precomputed and added
to the principal, 15 the consumer who prepaid his obligation was re-
quired to pay, in addition to the principal amount outstanding, any
interest which accrued since the last payment on the obligation. Since
there was no unearned interest, there was no right to rebate of un-
earned interest upon prepayment.
Chapter 519, which permitted precomputation of the interest, pro-
vided upon prepayment for a refund of interest based upon the "sum
of the digits" or "Rule of 78" method."16
113. Any discussion of prepayment includes a prepayment brought about by a re-
newal, refinancing or consolidation agreement.
114. FLA. STAT. § 516.15(3) (1971).
115. FLA. STAT. § 516.14(1) (1971).
116. FLA. STAT. § 519.08(1) (1971). This provision designated $10 per $100 per year
as the maximum charge of interest. Of this, $8 was to be considered interest and $2 as
reimbursement of expenses of making the loan. This distinction was significant because
the consumer who prepaid the obligation within ninety days of the making of the con-
tract was entitled to a refund based upon all of the initial charges ($10 per $100 per year)
as computed under the "Rule of 78." The operation of the "sum of the digits" or "Rule
of 78" method is shown in the following example. The loan consists of $100 principal and
$20 interest, making a total of $120 repayable in 12 months at $10 per month.
Periodic Balances Periodic Balances under
End of Month No. after Prepayment Original Contract
1 120
2 110
8 100
4 90
5 80
6 7O
Prepayment
7 60 60
8 50 50
9 40 40
10 30 30
11 20 20
12 10 10
TOTALS 210 780
210
7 X $20.00 = $5.38 [amount of interest refunded].
780
Though on first glimpse this would seem to penalize the prepaying debtor, this method
achieves a remarkably close approximation of actual interest earned.
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Under the CFA, the debtor is guaranteed the right of prepay-
ment,117 but there is no provision specifying the method by which the
rebate is to be computed. If, as some argue, the legislature intended
interest to be computed on the outstanding balances, from time to time,
then there is no need for rebate procedures since there was no pre-
computation of the interest.11 But even if the interest were precom-
puted, it seems relatively clear that the debtor would be entitled to a
full refund of unused interest. The CFA requires the licensee to "[p]er-
mit payment of the loan in whole or in part prior to its maturity with
interest on such payment to the date thereof."''  The method by
which computation would be made would thus be irrelevant so long
as the interest actually assessed and paid did not exceed that authorized
by the Act.
In addition to the rebate of the finance charges, the unused por-
tions of any credit life and disability insurance must be credited to
the borrower. The method to be used is the "Rule of 78."120
VII. DISCOUNTING INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRAcTS
Not only may licensees under the CFA loan money directly to
consumers, but they may also purchase retail installment contracts
from merchants who sell goods on credit.1 21 This practice could like-
wise be carried on by licensees under the SLA122 and registrants under
chapter 519.123 Prior to the enactment of the CFA, a separate license
under the Installment Sales Finance Act was unnecessary.124 However,
without amending the Installment Sales Finance Act, the legislature in
1973 enacted the following provision.
A licensee under the consumer finance act who purchases or holds
retail installment contracts as defined in section 520.31, Florida
Statutes, in Florida shall also be licensed under chapter 520 as an
installment sales finance act licensee.12 5
117. FLA. STAT. § 516.15(3) (1971) (unchanged by CFA). Similar provisions can be
found in UCCC H9 2.209, 3.209, and NCA § 2.209. See generally CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
U.S. 40-41.
118. See discussion relating to finance charges in section II supra.
119. FLA. STAT. § 516.15(3) (1971) (unchanged by CFA) (emphasis added).
120. FLA. TREAs. BULL. No. 402 (May 23, 1966).
121. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.51(1), 520.52(1) (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12.
122. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.51(1), 520.52(1) (1971).
123. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.51(1), 520.52(1) (1971).
124. "No person shall engage in the business of a sales finance company in this state
.without a license therefor as provided in this act; provided . . . that no . . . small loan
lender licensed under chapter 516, or any registrant under chapter 519, shall be required
to obtain a license under this act .... " FLA. STAT. § 520.52(1) (1971).
125. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(5)).
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It is presumed that the later statutory provisions will prevail. There-
fore, any company who wishes to do business under both acts should
be advised to comply with both the CFA and chapter 520 licensing
procedures. To avoid confusion, the legislature should mesh these pro-
visions in the near future.
It has been suggested by one commentator 1 26 that the combination
of sales finance companies and small loan business may be a question-
able step because of possible abuses. To illustrate his point, the author
cites examples where sales contracts are refinanced without the rebate
of unearned interest, but with additional charges being assessed under
the small loan laws. The result is that not only is interest being
charged on interest, but the creditor is collecting his charges twice for
the same period of time. Even though this type of "flipping" would be
illegal in Florida,"27 a similar abuse could take place. Under the Retail
Installment Sales Laws, a purchaser on credit is subject only to a
service fee of $10/$100, or about 18%. If he is having trouble making
his payments on time, he could be encouraged by the assignee (CFA
licensee) to refinance the balance. After making the proper rebates of
the unearned service charge, the assignee could now add new service
charges for the new term, not at the original 18%, but rather at the
small loan limits of 30%, 24% and 16%.128
To obviate such misuse of the licensee's dual function, the per-
centage rate of charge which may be assessed on refinancing should be
limited by the rate of charge originally contracted for. Thus, in our
example on refinancing, the licensee would be required to charge no
more than 18%.
VIII. CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. Scope
The next three subsections of this article deal with consumer pro-
tection provisions, which are part of the CFA but which have no
counterpart either in the SLA or in chapter 519. Although these pro-
visions will be discussed individually, they do have common scope
problems. The CFA provides that its protection
shall apply to every consumer credit transaction and contract in
which any form of credit is extended to an individual to purchase or
126. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 4, 12-13 (1954).
127. FLA. STAT. § 520.34(10) (1971).
128. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031).
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obtain goods or services for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes.12 9
Without more, it would seem that this provision would apply the
consumer protection provisions of the body of the section to all con-
sumer transactions, not only those within the ambit of the CFA. The
original draftsmen must have had this in mind.130 Had this been the
ultimate result, Florida would have been among the leading jurisdic-
tions that offer these protections to their citizens, but such was not the
case. When the proposed act was before the Florida Senate for approval
of certain House amendments, the following simple amendment which
was to deprive Florida of this distinction was proposed by Senator
Barron and adopted by the legislature: 131
Transactions governed.-Nothing in Chapter 516 shall apply to any
transaction, contract or loan other than one involving an extension
of credit by a licensee as defined in Chapter 516.182
Thus, legislation that surely would not have passed directly was also
halted from passage via a more devious route.
To ensure that the protections of this consumer protection section
are always available to debtors, the following provision was included:
"Waiver by the buyer of any provisions in this section shall be void
and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."'133
Although the scope of the section includes all consumer credit
transactions, the waiver provision is limited to "buyers." This must
have been a drafting oversight as the legislature could not have in-
tended that "buyers" should have more protection than "borrowers."
If the legislature should fail to remedy this obvious inconsistency, the
courts should judicially rule that in the case of nonbuyers, a waiver
of the protections of this section is null and void as contrary to public
policy.
B. Freedom from Defenses
The doctrine of holder in due course (HIDC) was developed at a
time when the vitality and free circulation of commercial paper was
thought essential to an expanding commercial economy.13 4 Its purpose
129. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(1)).
130. See COMM. SUB. FOR FLA. S. 835 (1973).
131. FLA. S. JouS. 527 (1973).
132. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 15 (§ 516.37).
133. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(6)).
134. See, e.g., CONSUMER CRjEDIT iN ThE U.S. 34; Hartmann & Walker, The Holder in
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was to give, subject to certain qualifications, the transferee or holder
of a negotiable instrument more rights, or fewer defects, than held by
its transferor, thus encouraging the transferability of such instru-
ments.""
Several prerequisites are essential to be a HIDC. First, there must
be a negotiable instrument1 3 and a holder.1 37 The holder may then be
a HIDC if he has taken the instrument for value, in good faith, and
without notice that it is overdue, has been dishonored or that there is
any defense against it or prior claim to it.1S Upon obtaining such
status, the HIDC takes the instrument free of personal defenses of the
debtor. Personal defenses are those such as prior payment, failure or
want of consideration, defects in the purchased merchandise giving
rise to warranty claims, or even nondelivery of the purchased product.
A HIDC, however, takes the instrument subject to real defenses such
as infancy, illegality, essential fraud and discharge in bankruptcy.18 9
The debtor finds that by the application of HIDC doctrine he has
in most instances lost the most effective tool for obtaining satisfaction
of his bargain, i.e., refusing to pay unless the agreement is carried out
as promised. The debtor is obligated to pay the HIDC and his only
recourse is to sue the original lender or merchant payee.
The advantages of HIDC doctrine can be gained without the use
of a negotiable instrument. This is achieved through the use of a
contractual waiver of defense. The most common usage of such a
waiver would be in a contract for the purchase of goods on credit, with
payments to be made in installments. A typical provision would read:
"Buyer(s) agree not to assert against any Assignee any claim or defense
arising out of this sale." Although the legality of contractual waivers of
defense was in question in many jurisdictions, 140 widespread adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has validated such pro-
visions.'4 1 Since the requirements and results of HIDC doctrine and
Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77 CoM. L.J. 116, 119 (1972); Rosenthal, Negotia-
bility-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1971).
135. "It is sometimes said that the holder in due course doctrine is like oil in the
wheels of commerce and that those wheels would grind to a quick halt without such
lubrication." J. wHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNEFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 457 (1972).
136. The requirements are set out in FLA. STAT. § 673.104 (1971).
137. "Holder" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 671.201(20) (1971).
138. FLA. STAT. § 673.302 (1971).
139. FLA. STAT. § 673.305 (1971).
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.206, Comment 1 (1971).
141. The UCC provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
[Vol. 1:373
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contractual waiver of defenses are so nearly the same, what follows re-
garding HIDC doctrine will also refer to contractual waivers of de-
fenses, unless otherwise stated.
Over the past several years there has been a parade of articles
through law journals, 14 2 consumer publications143 and elsewhere,' 4 4
pointing out the injustices of the doctrine and the hardships that it
works in the hands of unscrupulous merchants and lenders when they
team up against the consumer. 45 Those who would limit the rights of
a HIDC insist that the financial institutions that buy such consumer
obligations are in the best position to police lending and selling
faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type
which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
under the chapter on commercial paper (chapter 673). A buyer who as part of one
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such
an agreement.
FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971).
142. E.g., Hartmann & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Con-
sumer, 77 CoM. L.J. 116, 125 (1972); Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course
of Consumer Paper, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177 (1958); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 428-33 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Reg-
ulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, 469-473 (1968); Little-
field, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New U.C.C.C., 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 272 (1969); Rosenthal, Negotiability: Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REv.
375 (1971); Commentary, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder
in Due Course" in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 90 (1969); Com-
ment, Financing Consumer Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Installment
Buyers and Defaulting Sellers, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 513, 526 (1970); Note, Consumer Fi-
nancing, Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to a
Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 611 (1970); Note, The F.T.C. Proposed Rule and
the Holder in Due Course, 18 S.D.L. REV. 516 (1973); Comment, A Case Study of the
Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-off
Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
143. E.g., A Consumer Credit Code ... For Lenders, CONSUMER REP., March 1969, at
129; Consumer Fed'n of America, Policy Statement of Committee on Consumer Credit
Practices and Policies, March 6, 1971.
144. E.g., W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SsnE OF THE MARKET PLACE 118-19
(1968); Miller, Slum Swindlers Must Go, READERS DIGESr, Nov. 1969, at 169; Stricter Guide-
lines for the Money Lenders, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 20, 1973, at 82; The Battle Over Truth in
Lending Goes On, Nat'l Observer, Jan. 27, 1969, at 12, col. 4.
145. "In the wake of newspaper articles and consumer complaints concerning the use
of negotiable installment contracts in fraudulent home improvement schemes and other
consumer credit rackets, an attempt was made to bar the doctrine of holder in due course
from a large proportion of consumer credit transactions during the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code." LoPucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumer's Code-Or
Lender's Code?, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 335, 344 (1970).
The spring 1950 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-209(3), reads: "In
the case of a seller's purchase money security interest in consumer goods an agree-
ment not to assert claims and defenses arising out of the sales contract against an
assignee is not effective and a note given as part of such a transaction is subject to
such claims or defenses even though in the hands of a holder in due course."
Id. at 344 n.61. This provision is not part Of the recent drafts of the UCC,
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practices; they are the ones who are most able to learn of the improper
practices of their transferors. If one of these credit grantors does not
make it a practice to satisfy its customers, then the financial institution
should not purchase the paper of such transferor. 116
The countervailing arguments, of course, are that financial institu-
tions should not bear the sole responsibility for consumer irresponsibil-
ity in choosing a less than reputable seller or lender. Nor would the
institution be able to effectively and completely police the sellers and
lenders; it would thus be made subject to the costs of assigned defects
even when it had in good faith attempted to police. The result would
be either to drive up the costs of consumer credit or to dry up this
method of financing businesses, i.e., buying up their consumer obliga-
tions. Thus consumers would find their credit opportunities more
costly and/or constricted. Such changes would especially affect those
consumers who cannot qualify as direct borrowers from banks or
similar low interest financial institutions. Even those who would not
be impressed by this display of horribles must admit that there would
be a small class of persons who would abuse a non-HIDC situation by
refusing to pay the financial institution because of frivolous claims,
which could be quite costly in terms of attorney fees, institutional time
and adverse publicity.' 47
146. See, e.g., Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L.
REv. 387, 436 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented View-
point, 68 COLUM. L. Rev. 445, 472 (1968); Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses:
Plugging the Loopholes in the New U.C.C.C., 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272, 280-85 (1969); Stricter
Guidelines for The Money Lenders, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 20, 1973, at 82.
These arguments seem especially applicable for contractual waivers of defense because,
unlike the promissory note, the retail installment sales contract is usually negotiated only
one time; so the argument that the contract is a substitute for currency as a medium of
exchange is not very effective, since the exchange occurs only once. Furthermore, conceding
that the average consumer signing a promissory note realizes he must repay the money he
is borrowing, can the same be said of the consumer who signs a retail installment sales
contract and subsequently discovers he has not gotten what he bargained for?
147. See, e.g., Separate Statement of Senator William E. Brock in CONSuMER CREDIT iN
THE U.S. 231. In checking with several local bankers, it was found that these arguments
are not contrived but are quite seriously presented.
These fears were apparently unfounded, however. According to the [sic] Laurence
Buxbaum, Chief of the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's
Office: "[a]s far as we have been able to determine, the enactment of these two
statutes has had no substantial negative impact upon the flow of commercial paper
in Massachusetts. If anything, it has encouraged financial institutions to be more
thorough in their investigations of business concerns wishing to discount paper with
them. Representatives of the finance industry have encountered less difficulty than
they had anticipated at the time the legislation was being considered."
• . . According to Mr. Norman Polovoy, Assistant Attorney General and Chief
of the Consumer Protection Division, ". . . [o]ur experience in Maryland has shown
that there is absolutely no lack of available consumer credit in our State as a result
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Although courts have generally been reluctant to adopt any de-
cision which burdens a HIDC or unduly hampers the transferability of
negotiable instruments, 148 in recent years the courts have chipped away
at the doctrine. The most significant erosion is in the situation where
there is a close relationship between the original creditor and the al-
leged HIDC, sometimes referred to as the proximity rule"49 or the
"close connectedness" doctrine. 150 In such situations, if the financing
institution is in such proximity with the original creditor to evidence
a lack of good faith or to indicate that the financing institution was on
notice of the defects in the transaction, then the status of HIDC will
be denied.' 51
In addition to the judicial response to HIDC, many states have
legislated in the area. In addition to the seven states that have enacted
the UCCC, 15 2 several others have limited the doctrine to varying ex-
tents. 53
of the elimination of the holder-in-due-course doctrine in the consumer sales area."
Hartmann & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77 COM. L.J.
116, 123-24 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
148. See, e.g., Baraban v. Manatee Nat'l Bank, 212 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968), citing 11 AM. JUR. 2d Bills & Notes § 398 (1963).
149. Hartmann & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77
CoM. L.J. 116, 120 (1972).
150. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 479-84 (1972).
151. Id.; Hartmann & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Con-
sumer, 77 COM. L.J. 116, 120 (1972). See also Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649
(Fla. 1953) (HIDC); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (contractual waiver of defenses); Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford &
Co., 177 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1966)
(HIDC); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967) (HIDC).
Such erosion is not, however, without its critics:
The cases are unsatisfactory from an analytical standpoint-there seems to be a
piling of inference upon inference to reach a pre-determined end. They may per-
haps be justified on a social engineering basis when confined to consumer trans-
actions. Unfortunately, they have spilled over into sales by merchants to merchants,
and merchants do not need an umbrella of protections which may be necessary
over the heads of consumers.
Murray, The Consumer and the Code: A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 11,
65 (1968).
152. Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. The UCCC
provision governing negotiable instruments and HIDC provides:
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily
for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instru-
ment other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A
holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice that it
is issued in violation of this section. A holder in due course is not subject to the
liabilities set forth in the provisions on the effect of violations on rights of parties
[§ 5.202] and the provisions on civil actions by the Administrator [§ 6.113].
UCCC § 2.403. The UCCC gives two alternatives to govern contractual waivers of defense.
Alternative A prohibits such waivers, while Alternative B sets forth a complicated scheme
1973]
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whereby certain defenses can be cut off after notice of assignment and a three-month
waiting period. UCCC § 2.404.
153. The states that have statutory limitation on the HIDC doctrine have approached
the task in different ways. Massachusetts requires any promissory note executed in con-
nection with retail sales of consumer goods to have printed on its face "consumer note."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1972). This section has been construed to
make the holder of such note subject to all defenses which could be interposed against
the original payee. Alcoa Credit Co. v. Nickerson, 43 Mass. App. Dec. 1 (1968). Further-
more, Massachusetts specifies certain relationships between sellers and lenders which deny
HIDC status to lenders.
A creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all of the defenses
of the borrower arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of
the loan are used, if the creditor knowingly participated in or was directly con-
nected with the consumer sale or lease transaction.
Without limiting the scope of the preceding paragraph, a creditor shall be
deemed to have knowingly participated in or to have been directly connected with
a consumer sale or lease transaction if: (a) he was a person related to the seller or
lessor; (b) the seller or lessor prepared documents used in connection with the
loan; (c) the creditor supplied forms to the seller or lessor which were used by the
consumer in obtaining the loan; (d) the creditor was specifically recommended by
the seller or lessor to the borrower and made two or more loans in any calendar
year, the proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller or lessor,
or with a person related to the same seller or lessor; or (e) the creditor was the
issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the sale or lease
transaction as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the seller or
lessor.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1972).
Rhode Island requires the term "non-negotiable consumer note" to be on all consumer
notes and basically follows the Massachusetts provisions. R.I. GEN . LAws ANN. § 6-27-5
(Supp. 1972).
Hawaii provides that:
(b) No contract shall contain any provision by which a buyer agrees not to assert
against a seller a claim or defense arising out of the sale or agrees not to assert
against an assignee such a claim or defense other than as provided in subsection (d).
(d) No rights of action or defense arising out of a retail installment sale which
the buyer has against the seller shall be cut off by assignment, and in the event the
buyer has a good cause of action or defense against the seller the seller's assignee
has recourse against the seller for any losses he, the assignee, may incur as a result
thereof.
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 476-18 (1968).
Maryland requires any note taken in an installment transaction to make reference to
the agreement and subjects any subsequent holder of the note to all defenses or claims
that the debtor may have against the seller. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1969).
Washington requires recitation in all retail installment notes that no third party rights
of action or defenses are cut off by negotiation or assignment. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 63.14.020 (Supp. 1972).
Illinois provides that no rights of action or defenses are cut off by negotiation of
negotiable instruments issued in installment agreements unless there is in the agreement
a notice provision giving the debtor five days in which to notify the assignee of any
claims the debtor has against the seller. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262D (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1973).
Delaware basically follows the pattern of Illinois but allows fifteen days for notification.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1970).
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In Florida, until the passage of the CFA, the only legislative limita-
tion on the use of negotiable instruments and the resulting HIDC
doctrine was found in the Home Improvement Sales and Finance Act.
Every promissory note or mortgage shall bear on the side of the
note or mortgage which contains the maker's signature the following
legend in at least ten point boldface type: "Payment of this note or
mortgage is subject to the terms of a home improvement installment
contract of even date between maker and payee or mortgagor and
mortgagee." The contract may require execution of a promissory note
or mortgage.154
The key words of this statement, "subject to the terms of a home im-
provement installment contract," render the note nonnegotiable,1 5 5
thus negating the HIDC doctrine. The Home Improvement Sales and
Finance Act also prohibits any agreement in a home improvement
sales contract by which the buyer agrees not to assert a claim or de-
fense against the seller's assignee. 156 Thus contractual waivers of de-
fenses, as well as HIDC status, are unavailable to transferees of home
improvement sales contracts.
The CFA makes a frontal attack on the HIDC doctrine by provid-
ing that
[a] holder or assignee of any negotiable instrument or installment
contract, other than a currently dated check, which originated from
Connecticut requires all home solicitation sales notes to include notification that the
note is not negotiable and thereby makes assignees of the note subject to the debtor's
claims and defenses. The pleading and proof of such a recitation is a prerequisite to
enforcement of the note by the seller or assignee. But the negotiation of a note not con-
taining such a provision does not hinder subsequent HIDC rights and defenses. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-136 (Supp. 1973).
Oregon provides that no retail installment contract can require the making of a
negotiable note. The violation of this prohibition does not hinder subsequent HIDC
status but does subject the seller to claims by the debtor for loss and expenses incurred
in defending an action on the instrument. ORE. REV. STAT. § 83-650 (1971).
Vermont simply makes the holder of a promissory note or other evidence of consumer
indebtedness subject to all defenses that are available to the consumer in an action on a
simple contract. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1971).
California prohibits execution of any note by the buyer which cuts off third party
rights or claims. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1810.7 (West 1973).
New York makes an assignee of a retail installment contract subject to all claims and
defenses of the buyer notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, up to the amount
of the remaining balance of the contract. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAWS § 403(6) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1972).
154. FLA. STAT. § 520.80 (1971).
155. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.104, 673.105 (1971).
156. FLA. STAT. § 520.74(1) (1971).
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the purchase of certain consumer goods or services, is subject to all
claims and defenses of the consumer debtor against the seller of those
consumer goods or services. A person's liability under this section may
not exceed the amount owing to the person when the claim or de-
fense is asserted against the person.157
The scope of this provision may be quite limited. In addition to
the limitations discussed above, 5s the section seemingly applies only
to CFA licensees who are both licensed under chapter 520 and are
purchasing retail installment contracts. 59 If the statutory language,
"which originated from the purchase of certain consumer goods or
services," could be interpreted to include consumer loans, the statute's
coverage would be considerably broadened. It is quite doubtful that
any court would include "consumer loan" within the definition of
"consumer goods," but to the extent that licensees make loans available
to consumers who are desirous of credit and unable to borrow at the
lower bank rates, they are performing a "service." It may be stretching
the point, however, to suggest that the obtaining of such a loan is a
"purchase of ... services," instead of a mere utilization of the service.
Another construction may also be available to broaden the coverage.
If "which originated from" is taken to include all the circumstances
which occasioned the loan, then most uses of HIDC by a licensee would
be outlawed; e.g., 0 has an operation on his big toe, and to pay the
doctor he goes to LO Finance which gives him a loan; 0 signs a promis-
sory note and LO transfers the note to HI Finance; the need for the
loan "originated from the purchase of certain consumer goods or
services." Then the only loan that would not be included within the
terminology would be where the consumer-borrower has no particular
purchase in mind but merely wants additional liquidity.
The exemption of "a currently dated check" is one of common
sense, as checks are commonly considered to be akin to currency and
thus should be freely transferable. This exception will not be widely
used, as it is difficult to think of a factual situation where a licensee
could become a subsequent holder of such a check as to be entitled to
HIDC rights. The limitation that the check must be "currently dated"
is to avoid possible abuses of the check exception. Without such qualifi-
cation, the creditor on a thirty-six month repayment contract could
have taken thirty-six checks, one dated for each month of the con-
tract.160
157. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(2)).
158. See section VIII(A) supra.
159. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(2), (5)); FLA. STAT. §§ 520.31(7),
520.51(2), 520.52 (1971).
160. "A postdated check is nonetheless a check because postdated." 11 AM. JuR. 2d
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A significant loophole that is still available under the CFA is ex-
plained by New York's Governor Rockefeller.
Last year, the Legislature eliminated the "holder-in-due-course"
doctrine in most consumer credit transactions by prohibiting the
use of waiver of defense clauses in retail installment sales contracts.
Since then, however, a number of unscrupulous merchants and
finance companies, particularly in poverty areas, have managed to get
around the intent of the 1970 law through the use of the so-called
"specious cash sale."
The way this scheme works is that the unwary consumer who de-
sires to make an installment purchase is sent or even taken by the
merchant to a finance company, which will lend the consumer the
amount he needs for his intended purchase. The consumer then re-
turns to the merchant and makes a "cash" purchase. The 1970 law
did not apply to such "cash" transactions. Consequently, the con-
sumer who is stuck with defective or misrepresented goods must con-
tinue to pay back the loan from the finance company. 1'G
Other states besides New York have legislated with a view to this prob-
lem.162 The NCA163 and a recent redraft of the UCCC164 also provide
protection to the consumer in this area.
By limiting the section's coverage to negotiable instruments and
installment contracts, the legislature ignored the possibility of use
of nonnegotiable notes with a contractual waiver of defense clause. 16 5
This defect would be crucial only in the realm of loans because most
other transactions would be within the definition of "installment con-
tract." 66
The HIDC prohibition, though perhaps limited in scope, con-
siderably increases the debtor's rights vis-a-vis the subsequent assignee.
In most situations the debtor is not only entitled to use all his defenses
when pressed for payment, but he is also authorized to make claims
against the subsequent assignee for defects in the "certain consumer
goods or services." This right to make a positive claim against the
assignee, though at odds with the proposed UCCC,167 solidifies the posi-
Bills & Notes § 19 (1963). See also FLA. STAT. § 673.114 (1971).
161. 2 McKINNEY'S 1971 SFSSION LAWS OF N.Y. 2622-23 (1971). The remedial statute is
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
162. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.408
(Spec. Pamphlet 1973).
163. NCA § 2.407.
164. UCCC § 3.405 (Working Redraft No. 4, Dec. 1972).
165. For a discussion of nonnegotiable instruments see 11 AM. JuR. 2d Bills & Notes
§ 7 (1963).
166. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.31(7), 520.51(2) (1971).
167. "Rights of the buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted as a matter
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tion of UCC article 9, which provides: "[T]he rights of an assignee
are subject to ...all the terms of the contract between the account
debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom .... 16
The strength of the CFA "claim and defenses" provision is some-
what offset by the limitation at the end of the section. "A person's
liability under this section may not exceed the amount owing to the
person when the claim or defense is asserted against the person.' '1 9
Such a qualification limits the attractiveness of the assignee as a de-
fendant in warranty or other cases where a significant portion of the
obligation has already been paid. More consumer-prone provisions
have been suggested both in the Report of the National Commission
on Consumer Finance 170 and the NCA.17
Even with the discussed limitations, this section of the CFA will
surely encourage affected purchasers of consumer obligations to police
their transferors. The possibility of being subjected to a warranty
claim, for instance, should be enough to prod any buyer of consumer
paper to understand and regulate the practices of the seller of such
paper-his other alternatives of course are going out of the business of
buying consumer paper or opening an adjunct fix-it shop.17 2
C. Deficiency Judgments
There are no provisions in either the SLA or chapter 516 that
specifically provide for or deal with the topic of deficiency judgments.173
Florida's version of the UCC, however, has two pertinent statutes which
deal with the subject.
Section 679.504(1) states that "[a] secured party after default may
sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then
condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or
processing." The statute further provides that the proceeds are to be
applied to the expenses in the following order: first, the expenses of
preparation for resale, expenses of repossession, attorney's fees and
other such reasonable fees; second, the satisfaction of the indebtedness;
of defense ...." UCCC § 2.404, Alternative A. See aLso id. at § 2.404(3), Alternative B.
Contra, NCA § 2.406 ("subject to all claims and defenses"); CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S.
35 ("subject to all claims and defenses").
168. FLA. STAT. § 679.318(l)(a) (1971).
169. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(2)).
170. CONSUMER CREIrr IN THE U.S. 35 ("liability should not exceed the original
amount financed').
171. NCA § 2A06 ("amount of transaction total').
172. A provision which was part of the SLA and which was not repealed by the CFA
permits other businesses to be conducted in the same office. FLA. STAT. § 516.09(3) (1971).
173. Nor does the Retail Installment Sales Act (FLA. STAT. ch. 520 (1971)) contain
any such regulatory provisions.
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third, the satisfaction of any lesser secured interests if notice is given
and demand is properly made upon the first creditor. 174 Subsection (2)
basically states that the creditor must account to the debtor for any
surplus and unless otherwise agreed the debtor is liable for any de-
ficiency. 175
These provisions present two problems for the consumer. First, in
most instances there will be a deficiency rather than a surplus because
of the deflated price realized at a forced sale and the incident costs as
suggested by section 679.504(1). This result has prompted Professor
Gilmore, the chief draftsman of this portion of the UCC, to make the
following comment.'7 6
Sad experience has taught us that a power of sale coupled with a
right to a deficiency judgment, can be harder on the debtor than
strict foreclosure ever was. The surplus to be returned to the debtor
after the sale is a glittering mirage; the deficiency judgment is the
grim reality. Furthermore the person who buys at the sale today, nine
times out of ten, is not our hero, the good faith purchaser for value,
but the holder of the security interest who pays not in cash but by a
credit against the debt.
Second, quite seldom will the debtor have the economic power to
force the creditor to agree to limit his rights as regards the deficiency.
Section 679.505(1) requires that if the debtor has paid off at least
60% of the loan, has not signed a default statement renouncing his
rights and the creditor has taken possession of the collateral, the cred-
itor must dispose of the collateral within ninety days. Failure to comply
with this provision would subject the creditor to an action in con-
version or an action under section 679.507 which permits the con-
sumer-debtor to recover at least the credit service charge plus 10% of
the principal amount of the debt.17 7 Subsection (2) provides that in
any case not covered by subsection (1), the creditor may retain the
goods in satisfaction of the obligation if the debtor or any other secured
party does not make timely objection.178
This statute, though appearing to be designed for his benefit, does
little for the consumer. It would seem to protect him only in two types
of situations. First, where a large percentage of the indebtedness has
been paid off, the creditor must sell the collateral. This is beneficial to
174. FLA. STAT. § 679.504(1) (1971).
175. FLA. STAT. § 679.504(2) (1971). Identical language is found in FLA. STAT. § 679.-
502(2) (1971).
176. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1188-89 (1965).
177. FLA. STAT. § 679.505(1) (1971).
178. FLA. STAT. § 679.505(2) (1971).
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the debtor only if we assume that the sale will produce a surplus over
the remaining indebtedness. Second, in the cases where the creditor is
authorized to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation, the
debtor will probably profit because of the savings on the costs incident
to forced sale and because he will avoid a possible deficiency judgment.
In one of its more important provisions, the CFA restricts de-
ficiency judgments as follows:
If a creditor takes possession of property which was collateral under
a consumer credit transaction, the consumer shall not be personally
liable to the creditor for any unpaid balance of the obligation unless
the unpaid balance of the consumer's obligation at the time of de-
fault was $2000 or more [sic] the creditor shall be entitled to recover
from the consumer the deficiency, if any, resulting from deducting
the fair market value of the collateral from the unpaid balance due.
In a proceeding for a deficiency the fair market value of the col-
lateral shall be a question for the trier of fact. Periodically published
trade estimates of the retail value of goods shall, to the extent they
are recognized in the particular trade or business, be presumed to be
the fair market value of the collateral179
To justify a nearly identical provision, the draftsmen of the NCA
point out:
The major concern of a legitimate creditor is with respect to the rare
consumer who defaults on one of the early payments leaving used
collateral and a rather substantial unpaid balance. It is felt that this
concern is legitimate and should be accommodated, but only to the
extent that a significant transaction is involved.18 0
179. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(3)). The National Commission on Con-
sumer Finance in a similar provision exempts from deficiency judgments those transac-
tions where the sales price or loan (not "balance') was $1,765 or less. The reason the
figure of $1,765 was chosen is because it was found that most used cars would be below
that figure and most new cars would be above it. Likewise, a $1,765 limit would provide
protection to the consumer-debtor in most of his credit purchases of furniture and ap-
pliances. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 29-30. UCCC § 5.103 also utilizes the sales price
($1,000) rather than the balance.
180. NCA § 5.211, Comment 1; cf. UCCC § 5.103, which limits deficiency judgments
in two instances, both of which involve the sale of goods and/or services but not loans.
First, "[i]n cases of sales of $1000 or less, this section gives to the seller the option of
either suing for the unpaid balance or repossessing, but he may not do both." Id. at
Comment 3. The second instance involves a situation where the seller has taken a security
interest in collateral other than goods sold in the consumer credit sale. "In these cases, if
the cash price of the sale is $1000 or less, the seller who repossesses or voluntarily accepts
surrender of collateral may not obtain a deficiency judgment against the buyer . Id.
at Comment 4.
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The CFA provision apparently eliminates the possibility of de-
ficiency judgments in most sales and loans within its purview. The
maximum credit that may be extended by a licensee and still obtain
the more favorable interest rates is $2500, and the maximum term is
thirty-six months, fifteen days.18' If the debtor faithfully makes ten
monthly payments, he will have an outstanding principal balance of
less than $2,000 and thus not be subjected to a deficiency judgment. It
may be argued that after ten months there will be more than $2,000
owing if the obligation is viewed as including the principal plus in-
terest for the remainder of the term. Such an argument should be dis-
regarded, however, because at any time the debtor is entitled to prepay
without penalty8 2 and after ten payments the prepayment sum would
be less than $2,000.
There is one additional problem under this provision, however,
which may considerably weaken its consumer protection aspect. There
appears to be nothing to stop the creditor from getting a judgment
against the debtor for the "less than $2,000 balance" and then levying
execution on the debtor's property. Except for the application of the
homestead exemption,8 3 the net result of this action would seem to be
identical from the debtor's standpoint. The only advantages would
seem to flow to other creditors who may have had second priorities as
to the secured collateral but would be prior to a judgment lien.8 4
This situation may be remedied in two ways: first, the court presented
with such a situation could rule that to permit such a result clearly
violates the intent of the provision, since the legislature surely would
not intend to give the consumer-debtor a hollow right. Secondly, the
legislature could enact legislation to provide that if a creditor is not
entitled to a deficiency judgment, he will not be permitted to achieve
substantially the same result by first obtaining a judgment and then
levying execution against the property. 5
Even in those instances in which the balance is above the $2,000
cutoff point, the consumer-debtor is going to profit from the provisions
of the CFA. In such situations the creditor is to compute the deficiency
by taking the unpaid balance and subtracting from it the fair market
value of the collateral. This value is to be determined by the trier of
fact (the jury in the case of a jury trial and otherwise by the judge).
Periodic trade estimates of the retail value of goods would be presumed
to be the fair market value. Fair market value is used because, as men-
181. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031).
182. FLA. STAT. § 516.15(3) (1971).
183. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
184. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 679.301(1)(b), 679.312(5) (1971).
185. Cf. UCCC § 5.103(6).
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tioned previously, a forced sale of consumer goods will usually not
realize the value of the collateral, especially if the sale is made to
merchants or employees as is often the case with repossessed merchan-
dise. Therefore "blue books" and other trade publications or other
evidence of fair market value are felt to be more equitable to the
debtor and will protect his rights more efficiently. Though this may
appear to be a cumbersome procedure, it should prevent many of the
obvious overcharges and much of the undervaluation inherent in
forced sales.
D. Limitations on Collateral
Prior to the enactment of the CFA, there were few Florida pro-
visions regulating collateral besides Florida's version of the UCC,
which for the most part merely set up procedures by which the security
holder could gain priority over other creditors and established pro-
cedures which must be followed upon default and repossession. s6 The
one relevant provision in the SLA was in the same section as wage
assignments and was eliminated in the amending process:
[N]or shall any assignment or order, or any chattel mortgage or other
lien on household furniture then in the possession and use of the
borrower be valid unless it be in writing signed in person by the bor-
rower; or, if the borrower is married, unless it be signed in person by
both husband and wife .... 187
Restrictions on household goods as collateral have been strongly recom-
mended 8 and Florida should provide such protection. The National
Commission on Consumer Finance flatly recommends that "[a] creditor
should not be allowed to take other than a purchase money security
interest in household goods."'8 9 This provision would seem to be a
reasonable one because it would not discourage the purchase of goods
on credit but would eliminate much of the disruption of family life
which occurs when respossession of household goods is threatened.
One of the greatest abuses of using collateral as security for an
186. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.101-.507 (1971).
187. FLA. STAT. § 516.17 (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 8 (§ 516.17).
188. E.g., CONSUMEx CREDIT IN THE U.S. 27; NCA § 2.416.
189. CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE U.S. 27; accord, NCA § 2.416(2).
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is:
(1) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or (2) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used.
FLA. STAT. § 679.107 (1971).
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obligation is what is referred to as cross collateral. The use of cross
collateral is illustrated by the following example. Consumer goes into
Acme Furniture to purchase a living room suite on credit. He signs
the financing forms as provided by Acme. He faithfully makes his
monthly payments until 75% of the obligation is satisfied. Consumer
then returns to Acme Furriture to purchase a kitchen stove on credit.
Again he signs the financing forms and again he makes his payments
regularly and faithfully until it is nearly paid off. Then Consumer de-
cides he wants to buy a huge stereo outfit from Acme, which he does,
and again he signs the forms. Each time he purchases something from
Acme on credit, the agreement contains the following provision:
The amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by-
to Acme Furniture under this agreement shall be inclusive of and not
in addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made
by - under such prior agreements; and all payments now and here-
after made by - shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding agree-
ments between Acme Furniture and - until the time each such pay-
ment is made.
The effect of this provision is to keep a balance due on all items pur-
chased from this seller until they are all paid off. The injustice enters
when Consumer defaults on the payments on the agreement made for
the purchase of the stereo; he in fact is in default on all of the chain
of purchases he made from this seller. Thus Acme will repossess not
only the stereo, but also the kitchen stove and the living room suite.
Although this is only one of the forms that cross collateral can take, it
exemplifies the problem.90
To remedy this situation, the CFA includes the following provision:
If debts arising from two (2) or more retail installment sales or other
credit contracts with individual consumers are secured by more than
one (1) security interest or consolidated into one (1) debt payable
on a single schedule of payments and the debt is secured by security
interests taken with respect to one (1) or more of the sales, payments
received by the seller are deemed, for the purpose of determining the
amount of the debt secured by the various security instruments, to
have been first applied to the payment of the debt arising from the
sale first made. To the extent debts are paid according to this section,
security interests in items of property terminate as the debt originally
incurred with respect to each item is paid. Payments received by the
190. Even though the example is of a seller of merchandise, the same chain of events
could occur if the creditor was making a series of advances and taking new collateral for
each advance.
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seller or holder upon a revolving account are deemed, for the purpose
of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security
interests, to have been applied first to the payment of finance charges
in the order of their entry to the account and then to the payment of
debts in the order in which the entries to the account showing the
debts were made. If the debts consolidated arose from two (2) or
more credit sales or other credit contracts with an individual which
were made on the same day, payments received by the seller or holder
are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt
secured by the various security interests, to have been applied first
to the payment of the smallest debt.','
Although this provision does not prohibit cross collateral arrangements,
it eliminates their inherent evil by requiring all payments to be applied
first to the earlier obligations, according to their relative dates of
creation. The security interest in the collateral terminates on a first-in,
first-out basis as each item is paid off. If the transactions involved are
made on the same day, then the payments are applied first to the
smallest debt.
There are, however, problems with the interpretation of this sec-
tion. The most important is its scope. Although there is little question
that it is limited to transactions with licensees, 9 2 there appears to be
some confusion as to whether it was intended to apply to both con-
sumer sales and loans. Although the section begins by referring to "re-
tail installment sales or other credit contracts," which would be broad
enough to include loans, the body of the section refers only to "sales,"
"sellers," and "seller or holder." The only one of these terms which
could clearly include loans is "holder."'193 The last sentence of the
section again uses the language "credit sales or other credit con-
tracts." To resolve the confusion, this section should be read in light
of the stated scope: "This section shall apply to every consumer credit
transaction and contract in which any form of credit is extended to an
individual to purchase or obtain goods or services for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes."'19' When so read, it seems
clear that the intended application of this section includes not only
consumer sales transactions but consumer loans as well, except for
those rare situations where the money is being borrowed for reasons
other than "to purchase or obtain goods or services."
191. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(4)). A similar provision was made part
of the Retail Installment Sales Act. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-34. The provisions seem to be
modeled after UCCC § 2.409. See also CONSUMER CREIT IN THE U.S. 26-27.
192. See section VIII(A) supra.
193. "Holder" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 671.201(20) (1971).
194. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.31(1)).
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Another problem, although not serious, relates to the language
dealing with "revolving accounts." Since the section is limited in its
application to licensees who are to be making loans or buying retail
installment contracts, and since the definition of "retail installment
contract" does not include "revolving accounts,"' 95 the revolving ac-
count provision seems to be misplaced.
One additional provision of the CFA also regulates the taking of
collateral: "A licensee may not take a security interest secured by land
on any loan less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)." 1196 This pro-
vision seems to be quite reasonable-the very possibility of a debtor
losing his home because of an insignificant sum being borrowed against
it is shocking. The drafters of the NCA have gone even further by ex-
tending the exclusion to $3,000.'9, The $1,000 limitation should have
little effect on the licensees, however, because real estate mortgages are
seldom taken in conjunction with small loans.198
Certain limitations on collateral are desirable. Quite often a greedy
creditor will tie up all of the debtor's property for a very small obliga-
tion. This has the practical effect of freezing the debtor's credit, at
worst, or restricting his business to the creditor who holds the security
interest. To remedy such situations restrictions should be placed on the
value of the collateral vis-a-vis the loan principal. 99
IX. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON CREDITORS' PRACTICES AND
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
A. Confessions of Judgment
The confession of judgment provision, sometimes referred to as a
"cognovit note,"200 permits the creditor, on default, to obtain a judg-
ment against the debtor without either notice or opportunity to appear.
Normally, in such a situation, the first notice that the debtor receives
is when the creditor is seeking to enforce the judgment by levy of ex-
ecution or garnishment. The debtor placed himself in this position by
signing a warrant of attorney which authorized another to receive
195. "Retail installment contract" is defined in FLA. STAT. §§ 520.31(7), .51(2) (1971).
196. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(1)); accord, UCCC § 2.407(l).
197. NCA § 2.416(3)(a).
198. The Discount Consumer Financing and Small Loan Annual Reports do not even
include real estate in the itemized "Analysis of Loans by Types of Security." ANNUAL
REPORTS 11-12.
199. See, e.g., NCA § 2.416(3)(b).
200. A confession of judgment provision is a broad term encompassing arrangements
where the debtor executes a warrant of attorney. The term "judgment (or cognovit) note"
is more correctly applied to negotiable notes containing confession clauses.
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notice and to confess judgment. A due process violation is technically
avoided because the confessing attorney is the agent of the debtor.
Confessions of judgment have been prohibited by many states'
and the National Commission on Consumer Finance has stated:
No consumer credit note or contract should be permitted to con-
tain a provision whereby the debtor authorizes any person by warrant
of attorney or otherwise, to confess judgment on a claim arising out
of the consumer credit transaction without adequate prior notice to
the debtor and without an opportunity for the debtor to enter a
defense. 202
Florida likewise generally prohibits confessions of judgment. 203 Both
the SLA and the CFA contain specific prohibitions against confessions
of judgment: "No licensee shall take any confession of judgment or
any power of attorney. '" 20 4 The invalid confessions are severable and
the provision does not invalidate an otherwise valid loan, but merely
renders the provision containing such power invalid.2 0 5
The Florida courts have held, however, that a judgment that is
taken pursuant to a confession, which if valid in the jurisdiction where
rendered, will be enforceable in Florida.2 0 6 But even this limited rec-
ognition of confessions of judgment may be subject to further qualifica-
tion.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision, Swarb v. Lennox,207
has declared the Pennsylvania practice of taking judgments by con-
fession unconstitutional, not on its face, but as it applies to consumers
with income less than $10,000 annually. The Court affirmed the de-
cision of a three-judge federal district court in its holding that all
entries of confessed judgments against members of this class were
prospectively enjoined unless it is shown that the consumer had in-
tentionally, understandingly and voluntarily waived his rights to pre-
judgment hearing and notice. The Supreme Court did recognize that
201. For a compilation of circumstances in which confessions of judgment and
cognovit notes are prohibited see I CCH CONSUMER CRnrr GUmE 610 (1972). The
UCCC and the NCA both prohibit confessions of judgment. See UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407;
NCA § 2.404(1).
202. CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE U.S. 26.
203. FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1971).
204. FLA. STAT. § 516.16 (1971) (unchanged by CFA).
205. Mason v. City Fin. Co., 151 So. 521 (Fla. 1933).
206. See, e.g., Carroll v. Gore, 143 So. 633 (Fla. 1932); Pearson v. Friedman, 112 So. 2d
894 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
207. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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under appropriate circumstances a debtor may be held to have waived
his rights by signing a cognovit note.20 8
B. Assignment of Wages
Generally speaking, an employee may assign unpaid wages already
earned, or future earnings where the employee is under an actual
contract of employment, except in the case of public officers ....
That the state, in the exercise of its police power, may regulate,
limit, or prohibit assignments of wages to be earned is generally rec-
ognized. 209
The problem of assignment of wages in relation to a consumer loan
was thought to be a special problem and thus merited special legisla-
tion. The SLA210 and chapter 519211 contained identical provisions,
which specifically required that the loan be paid to the borrower simul-
taneously with the execution of the assignment, that the assignment be
in writing and, if the borrower is married, that the spouse's signature
be included, unless he has been separated for at least five months. The
CFA, on the other hand, makes a blanket prohibition of wage assign-
ments.21
2
In spite of outward appearance, this change really did little to im-
prove the consumer's position vis-a-vis the small loan lender. Not only
had the attorney general ruled that wage assignments by government
employees were invalid and not binding on government employers, 21
but he had also ruled that any notice to an employer of a wage as-
signment was improper and contrary to law and "moreover, resort to
such a device . . . may well be violative of Section 516.29, Florida
Statutes, 1957, which provides for the suspension or revocation of
license for the use of unreasonable collection tactics. '214 In later cor-
208. Such a situation occurred in D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972), which was handed down the same day as Swarb. In Overmeyer, which involved a
commercial situation where a corporate debtor knowingly signed an installment note con-
taining a cognovit clause, the court upheld the validity of such a provision on the basis
of the factual circumstances. A previous lower court decision which had denied enforce-
ment of such clauses upon the basis of a fourteenth amendment due process violation,
has been vacated by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of the Swarb
decision. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971 (1972).
209. 3 FLA. JuR. Assignments § 8 (1955).
210. FLA. STAT. § 516.17 (1971).
211. FLA. STAT. § 519.11 (1971).
212. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 8; accord, NCA § 2.403(1); UCCC 99 2.410, 3.403.
The UCCC, however, does not prohibit the use of wage deductions, if the debtor can
revoke his authorization.
213. [1959-1960] FLA. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REp. 224; see [1953-1954] FLA. A'r'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 125; [1951-1952] FLA. A-r'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 599.
214. Letter from Atty. Gen. Richard Ervin to .Lewis Tribble, General Counsel to the
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respondence, the general counsel to the comptroller advised that all
small loan companies and consumer finance companies should be
notified "that such an assignment gives them only a lien which can be
enforced by proper court action." 2 15 In fact, in 1971, of the thirty-seven
wage assignments taken by the lenders operating under chapter 519,
only one was brought to court action and thus enforced.2 16
Though the provisions and interpretations which limit or even
eliminate wage assignments purport to recognize "the potential for
hardship for a consumer and his dependents which may result from a
disruption of the steady flow of family income,' ' 21 7 to totally eliminate
this form of collateral may be more to the debtor's detriment. Many
debtors have no collateral other than their wages to offer as security for
a loan. 218 The National Commission on Consumer Finance has pro-
posed what seems to be a workable compromise.2 19
In consumer credit transactions involving an amount financed ex-
ceeding $300, a creditor should not be permitted to take from the
debtor any assignment, order for payment, or deduction of any
salary, wages, commissions, or other compensation for services or any
part thereof earned or to be earned. In consumer credit transactions
involving an amount financed of $300 or less, where the creditor
does not take a security interest in any property of the debtor, the
Comptroller, Nov. 3, 1959. Attorney General Ervin based his opinion on the following
reasoning. Prior to the 1953 legislative session,
[s]ection 516.17, Florida Statutes, contained a provision permitting the service upon
employers of licensees' debtors a notice of wage assignment, together with certain
directions to said employers for the partial withholding and remittance of the
debtor's wages for the benefit of the licensee.
It has been held that when the legislature initially included the provision for
notice and service upon employers of wage assignments, it had thereby created an
additional remedy in favor of small loan companies for the collection of a debt.
Parliament Loan Corporation v. Coward Brothers, 7 Fla. Supp. 14. The wage as-
signment being but a means of enforcing payment of a debt and this being a
remedy given by law and not of the essence of the loan contract, it was entirely
within the control of the law-making power by whose authority it was given life
to abolish the remedy.
Id.
215. Letter from Lewis Tribble, General Counsel to the Comptroller, to Roy Caruth-
ers, Director of the Small Loan Department, Nov. 4, 1959.
216. ANNUAL REPORTS 11-12. In the portion of the report dealing with the SLA there
are no separate statistics for wage assignments.
217. UCCC § 2.410, Comment.
218. "In fact, 99 percent of the loans that the Municipal Credit Union makes are
based upon the wage assignment with no co-makers, no security .... " Hearings on H.R.
11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1204 (1967), as cited in H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER
CREDrr: TExT-CASES-MATERIALS 171 (1970); accord, CONSUMER CRmrr IN THE U.S. 31.
219. CONSUMER CRnmrr IN THE U.S. 31.
CONSUMER FINANCE Acr
creditor should be permitted to take a wage assignment but in an
amount not to exceed the lesser of 25 percent of the debtor's dispos-
able earnings for any workweek or the amount by which his dispos-
able earnings for the workweek exceeds 40 times the Federal mini-
mum hourly wage prescribed by section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 in effect at the time.
The Commission goes on to recommend additional protection for the
debtor by suggesting that if, because of default, the assignment be-
comes operative, the debtor should have the right to ask an appropriate
court to have the assignment stayed if it would cause the debtor hard-
ship because of an unexpected emergency such as an illness in the
family.220
C. Balloon Payments
A balloon payment is a provision in an installment loan or other
closed-end credit transaction which provides for a payment substantially
in excess of the average monthly payment. This device is often utilized
in credit sales or loans to persons with seasonal or otherwise irregular
sources of income. Balloon payments are, however, subject to abuse
where, for no particular reason, a consumer enters into such an in-
stallment agreement.
There are two problem areas. First, unless the consumer is aware
of the balloon payment, the monthly payment he agrees upon is going
to be deceptively low. Second, if the consumer is unable to make the
balloon payment at the end of the term, he may find that he must
refinance the final balloon payment at a rate exceeding the original
contract interest rate, or he may be forced to default on his obligation,
which would entitle the creditor to enforce his security interest. 221
The SLA made no specific reference to whether balloon payments
were permitted to be included in the loan contract. Chapter 519, how-
ever, required the loan to be repayable in "substantially equal monthly
or other periodic installments," which would seem to eliminate balloon
payments.2 2
220. Id. at 32. See also Uniform Small Loan Law § 17 (Rev. Draft No. 7, June 1942),
quoted in B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDr LEGISLATION 144, 155-56 (1965) (wage
assignments limited to "a sum not to exceed 10 percent of the borrower's salary'). Also,
the principal amount that can be borrowed is $300. Id. at 153.
221. The CCPA provisions on disclosure provide that irregular or unequal periodic
installments must be disclosed. CCPA §§ 1638(8), 1639(6), and Reg. Z § 226.8(b)(3),
specifically provide for the identification of a "payment more than twice the amount of
an otherwise regularly scheduled equal payment" as a "balloon payment" and provide
that conditions for refinancing, if any, shall also be disclosed. The only weakness of the
federal regulation is that it does not require the creditor to allow refinancing.
222. FLA. STAT. § 519.08 (1971). For additional Florida statutes regulating balloon
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To prevent any abuse of balloon payments, the CFA simply pro-
vides that "[e]very loan made pursuant to this chapter shall be repaid
in monthly installments as nearly equal as mathematically practica-
ble. " 223 On balance this general prohibition is desirable even in light
of legitimate uses where a particular debtor's income and ability to
repay are subject to fluctuation.
D. Multiple Agreements
An example of the possible misuse of multiple agreements arises
in the following context. Under the CFA Florida has, for a $600 loan,
a rate limitation of 30% on the first $300 and 24% on the second $300.
But if two $300 loans can be arranged at one sitting, the creditor could
receive 30% on each. It is conceivable that many agreements could be
made and signed nearly simultaneously. A further possible abuse of a
graduated rate limitation and multiple agreements is where the hus-
band would sign an agreement for one loan and the wife would sign
an agreement for another, when both agreements are really part of one
basic transaction.2 2 4 These practices were prohibited by both the SLA2 25
and chapter 5 19.22 This policy is carried over to the CFA.2 27
No licensee shall induce or permit any borrower to split up or
divide any loan. No licensee shall induce or permit any person, or
any husband and wife, jointly or severally, to become obligated to
him, directly or contingently or both, under more than one (1) con-
tract of loan at the same time, for the purpose or with the result of
payments see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 520.08(3), .34(3), .78(2) (1971).
223. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.36); RuLEs § 3-2.19. This language is
very similar to that of the NCA § 2.402 except that subsection 2 provides for exclusions
where a collateral agreement as to seasonal increases in payments coincides with income
fluctuation. The National Commission on Consumer Finance would not go this far, how-
ever. It suggests
[w]ith respect to a consumer credit transaction, other than one primarily for an
agricultural purpose or one pursuant to open end credit, if any scheduled payment
is more than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments, the con-
sumer should have the right to refinance the amount of that payment at the time
it is due without penalty. The terms of the refinancing should be no less favorable
to the consumer than the terms of the original transaction. These provisions do not
apply to a payment schedule which, by agreement, is adjusted to the seasonal or
irregular income of the consumer.
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 39; accord, UCCC §§ 2.405, 3.402.
224. Both CCPA §§ 1638(a)(7), 1639(a)(5), and Reg. Z § 226.8(b) prohibit the division
of consumer credit transactions in such a manner as to avoid their disclosure provisions.
But note that these federal provisions do not affect rate regulation.
225. FLA. STAT. § 516.14(2) (1971); see also FLA. STAT. § 516.21 (1971).
226. FLA. STAT. § 519.08(5) (1971).
227. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(6)). See also Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192,
§ 11 (§ 516.21).
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obtaining a greater finance charge than would otherwise be per-
mitted by this section.22s
X. PENALTIES
The general usury statute229 provides that any interest extracted in
excess of the maximum allowable charges gives the debtor a right of
action for double the amount of interest received in excess of that
allowed by law. The debtor is also entitled to attorney's fees when he
brings a successful action under this section. In addition, the lender
"forfeit[s] the entire interest so charged, or contracted to be charged,"
and is entitled to recover only the principal sum under the loan agree-
ment.
230
Furthermore, any person who wilfully and knowingly charges, takes
or receives interest in excess of 25% but less than 45%/ per annum is
guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by not more than sixty days
in prison or a maximum fine of $500 or both. 231 If the interest rate is
45%/ or more, the creditor is guilty of a felony and can be imprisoned
up to five years or fined $5,000 or both.2 3 2 Also, any person who know-
ingly and wilfully makes an extortionate extension of credit or con-
spires to do so can be imprisoned up to fifteen years or fined $10,000 or
both.2 3 3
Any loan which exacts interest in excess of 25%/ per annum, unless
it is entered into under the authority of one of the statutory exceptions,
is unenforceable, as to both interest and principal. 23 4
The SLA, chapter 519 and the CFA are specific exceptions to the
general usury statutes, 235 and licensees are subject to its provisions only
to the extent that the interest charged exceeds that authorized by the
various acts. 2 6
In addition to the penalties enumerated above, under the SLA,237
228. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(6)). This provision is very similar to
NCA § 2.413. Compare UCCC §§ 2A02, 3.409, 3.509. The UCCC provisions are subject to
criticism because they do not link the transactions of husband and wife when part of
substantially the same transaction.
229. The general usury law of Florida is embodied in FLA. STAT. ch. 687 (1971). The
SLA, chapter 519 and the CFA are excepted from its application by FLA. STAT. §§ 516.02,
519.03, 519.08 (1971), and Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 9.
230. FLA. STAr. § 687.04 (1971).
231. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(2) (1971).
232. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(3) (1971).
233. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(4) (1971).
234. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(7) (1971).
235. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.031, 516.02, 519.03, 519.08 (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 9.
236. FLA. STAT. § 687.031, 687.071 (1971).
237. FLA. STAT. § 516.14(l) (1971).
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chapter 519238 and the CFA,23 9 if the creditor contracting with a debtor
is in violation of the maximum rate allowed, the obligation is void and
the creditor has no right to collect either the principal or interest
thereon. Each of these acts provides that if such an overcharge occurred
by accidental or bona fide error, the licensee can refund the overcharge
within five days of the discovery of the error without violating the act.24 0
A violator of the SLA or chapter 519 was subject to punishment or
a fine of $500 and/or imprisonment of sixty days.241 The CFA leaves
these sanctions unchanged.
The Department had the power to revoke a license upon ten days
notice and an opportunity to be heard if the licensee either knowingly
or without due care violated any provision of the SLA or chapter 519. 24 2
The CFA has not changed this authority. The CFA, like its predeces-
sors, provides that any revocation of a license is subject to judicial
review.243
Furthermore, the Department has authority to issue desist orders
and to seek injunctive relief from an appropriate court against anyone
the Department has reasonable cause to believe is violating or is about
to violate any provision of the particular act.2 44
XI. MANAGER QUALIFICATIONS
A person may be born with a bossy disposition, but many other
qualities must be added by study and work.24 5
The CFA incorporates a new provision relating to the qualification
of each loan office's manager.
238. FLA. STAT. §§ 519.06, 519.08(4) (1971).
239. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.031(5)).
240. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.14(1), 519.08(4) (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 7 (§ 516.-
031(5)). RULES § 3-2.20 provides:
Should a licensee charge, contract for, or receive interest or charges in excess of
those permitted, and such overcharge is a result of a bona fide error, the loan con-
tract shall remain valid and no penalty shall result, provided that the licensee shall
refund or credit the borrower with the amount of such overcharge within five (5)
days of the licensee's discovery of such error. In the event that the discovery of
such overcharge was the result of a complaint by a borrower or of the Department,
the Department shall investigate the circumstances surrounding the making of the
overcharge and shall determine whether it was the result of bona fide error.
241. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.19, 519.06 (1971).
242. FLA. STAT. § 516.07(l)(a) (1971).
243. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.25, 516.07(7), 519.14 (1971) (unchanged by CFA).
244. FLA. STAT. § 516.23 (1971) (unchanged by CFA). See also FLA. STAT. § 519.12(5)
(1971).
245. THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA MONTHLY LmxrR, June 1973, at 1.
[Vol. 1:379
CONSUMER FINANCE Acr
Upon application for an original or renewal license, each applicant
or licensee shall designate or appoint a manager for each location
to be licensed. Each such manager shall have been employed by a
licensee under this chapter or under chapter 519, Florida Statutes,
or by a subsidiary, affiliate, parent, or partner of the licensee for a
total period of at least twelve (12) months or shall have successfully
passed an examination based on the law and provisions of this
chapter or chapter 519, Florida Statutes, and rules and regulations
thereunder. The foregoing requirement shall not apply to any per-
son employed as such principal manager of a licensee on the effective
date of this provision.
2 4
6
This provision should not be burdensome and will ensure that each
new manager has at least some familiarity with the statutes and pro-
cedures governing his charge. This knowledge would seem to be par-
ticularly important when considering the intricacy of the new con-
sumer protection provisions. The statute should have likewise required
similar testing of all existing managers on these new provisions. Hope-
fully, the same result will be achieved by educational programs con-
ducted by the Department, by associations and by companies them-
selves.
XlI. LICENSING AND ADMINISTRATION
Under the SLA, chapter 519 and presently under the CFA the De-
partment is given the authority to regulate licensing,2 47 investigate
violations,248 make routine examination of records249 and promulgate
rules and regulations.25 0
Any piece of legislation dealing with licensing must confront the
question of who is to be licensed and by what standards the applicants
are to be measured. The SLA and chapter 519 required a showing of
"financial responsibility, experience, character and general fitness . . .
such as to command the confidence of the public"251 and "convenience
and advantage to the community,"2 52 plus a minimum capital require-
246. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.231).
247. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.03, 519.07 (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 3.
248. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.11(1), 519.12(4) (1971); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 5.
249. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.11(2), 519.12(3) (1971). Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, did not
change FLA. STAT. § 516.11(2) (1971).
250. FLA STAT. §§ 516.22(1), 519.12(6) (1971). Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, did not
change FLA. STAT. § 516.22(1) (1971).
251. FLA. STAT. § 519.07(4)(a) (1971).
252. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.05(2)(b), 519.07(4)(b) (1971).
There appears to be only one Florida court decision involving "convenience and ad-
vantage." In Pilafian v. Green, 141 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1962), the state comptroller turned
down an application for a small loan license for a business to be located on Key Biscayne.
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ment.253 The CFA has retained these standards which limit entry into
the consumer lending field and thereby restrict free competition.
The "convenience and advantage" criteria originated in the fifth
draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law in 1932254 and was enacted in
Florida in 1957. 2 5 The provision was an attempt to curtail excesses re-
sulting from a very competitive market.2 56 It was feared that free entry
would cause a great influx of lenders into the market, drive lenders to
illegal means to make profits and stabilize rates at the maximum allow-
able, which would actually defeat competition.
By limiting the number of offices in any one community through
application of the "convenience and advantage" test, it could be argued
that benefits of economies of scale would be realized by lowering the
cost per loan outstanding. Whether there is such a benefit derived from
large operations is questionable.2 57 And it is even more questionable
whether any benefits derived from lower costs would in fact be passed
on to the consumer in the form of lower rates, for it may follow that
small loan companies will tend to charge the maximum rates neverthe-
less and reap the profit of their increased efficiency.
Some feel that free entry will lead to grave problems resulting from
competition between amateur and professional lenders.258 It has been
stated that
these new freedoms would be to the competitive disadvantage of in-
stitutions such as banks which would remain subject to restrictive
licensing. Early reports from Utah, where the UCCC concept of "free
entry" is now in effect, indicate, however, that there has been no great
rush into the lending field by non-lending businesses, and no major
shifts of consumer credit away from the traditional sources of credit
or from one such source to another. This is not surprising, as there
The district court of appeal affirmed the circuit court by upholding the denial upon
the fact that Key Biscayne, even though having no money lenders licensed at that time,
was inhabited by several hundred people who were of the expensive luxury home class
and had no need for this company. Also there were 177 lenders within Dade county that
were available to the inhabitants of Key Biscayne. Even though the court said it based
its affirmation on the definition of "community" it seemed to place great weight on the
lack of demand for such service in the immediate area.
253. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.05(2)(c), 519.07(4)(c) (1971).
254. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 4, 17 (1954).
255. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201, § 4.
256. Sullivan, Administration of a Regulatory Small Loan Law, 8 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 146, 148 (1941).
257. CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE U.S. 114.
258. Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 53, 62 (1969).
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will be a natural tendency for creditors, because of economies of op-
eration, to limit their activities to fields of their special expertise.2 59
A further fear is that with a large number of lenders in the market,
it will become hard for the consumer to tell who is a legitimate lender
and who is a loan shark. This confusion will provide an atmosphere
which is conducive to loan sharking. In criticizing this argument, how-
ever, one commentator noted that
[1]oan sharks operate illegally anyway, and do not want to submit to
the controls of licensing, reports, inspection and the like. It is hard
to see how an increase in the number of legal lenders through free
entry can help the loan sharks who continue to operate illegally; and
it is hard to see how one who was willing to be an oppressive and
illegal lender outside the law is likely to be any more dangerous in
the unusual case where he chooses to take a license and becomes sub-
ject to the law's disciplines.260
The limited entry aspects of the CFA run contrary to that espoused
by the UCCC. The Code provides for free entry into the field by
merely requiring the applicant to pass the test of financial responsibil-
ity, character and fitness. 261 The stated rationale for the Code's position
is to foster free entry into the credit market and thereby hopefully re-
duce the rates.2 62 As stated in the comments to the Code:
This section [on licensing] is intimately related to disclosure ...
and to maximum charges .... The purpose is to facilitate entry into
the cash loan field so that the resultant rate competition fostered by
disclosure will generally force rates below the permitted maximum
charges....
A secondary purpose is to reduce the likelihood of establishing
localized monopolies in the granting of cash credit. Such monopolies
tend to push rates charged to the maximum permitted levels and to
establish conditions under which some share of the anticipated
259. Address by Robert N. Winston, Vice-President of American Finance Manage-
ment Corporation, to the Joint Kansas-Nebraska Association, June 17, 1970, as cited in
Peters, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 28 WASH. & LEE L. RFv. 75, 90 (1971). The
Deputy Administrator of the Consumer Credit Bureau of the State of Utah noted that
there had been no rush for supervised lender licenses in Utah. Letter from William C.
Wideman to Division of Statutory Research and Drafting of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, as cited in Peters, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 75,
90 (1971).
260. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM.
L. REv. 445, 486-87 (1968).
261. UCCC § 3.503(2).
262. UCCC § 3.503, Comments 1 & 2.
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monopoly profits are devoted to direct or indirect pressures to obtain
the license. 213
An even more lenient position is taken by the National Commission
on Consumer Finance which
recommends that the only criterion for entry (license) in the finance
company segment of the consumer credit market be good character,
and that the right to market entry not be based on any minimum
capital requirements or convenience and advantage regulations. 264
Once a license26 5 has been issued and applicable fees 266 have been
collected, the Department under the CFA is given the responsibility of
examining books, records, accounts and files of licensees.2 7 The De-
partment is required to conduct such an examination at least twice a
year.2 6 8
Mandatory examinations are desirous because if such examinations
263. Id.
264. CONSUMER CREnrr IN THE U.S. 138. The Commission recommended this in con-
junction with increased maximum rate allowances.
265. FLA. STAT. § 516.09(1) (1971) requires a license for each place of business. Ad-
vocates of this view argue that without this requirement, it would virtually be impossible
to keep lenders under control. The UCCC advocates a single license concept, requiring
only one license per lender even though he operates more than one office in the state.
UCCC § 3.502, Comment 3. An opponent of this single license concept has stated:
In order to effectively supervise the business, the Administrator should know at all
times where supervised loans are being made. The code should require a place of
business in the state, since, obviously, the Administrator has no official standing out-
side the borders of his own state. The code does not require such an in-state place
of business; it mandates but one license for the entire state, regardless of the num-
ber of offices; and demands notice of each location once a year (changes occurring
between any notification dates, however, need not be reported to the Administrator).
Thus, it is possible under the UCCC for a lender to make door-to-door loans or to
fix up a bus or other vehicle as a traveling loan office, moving it constantly around
the state. Furthermore, since there is no requirement that any office be within the
state, he could headquarter his operations out of state. This will make enforcement
difficult, if not impossible.
Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 53,
63 (1969).
266. The CFA requires an annual license fee of $175.00 and a nonrefundable in-
vestigation fee of $200.00. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 3. SLA and chapter 519 required
a nonrefundable investigation fee of $100.00 and an annual license fee of $100.00. F.
STAT. §§ 516.03(1), 519.07(1) (1971).
267. FLA. STAT. § 516.11(1) (1971) was amended by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 5, to
make it clear that the Department has access to all records of licensees whether within
or without the state.
268. FLA. STAT. § 516.11(2) (1971) (unchanged by CFA). At the time of each examina-
tion every licensee is required to pay to the Department a fee based upon the amount of
outstanding loans due the licensee at that time.
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were abolished, violations would surely become much more numerous
and control of the credit market would be totally relinquished.
There is a tremendous difference between regular examinations and
the right to investigate .... It is only through regular examinations
that contravention of the code will be uncovered .... 210
Those who support abolition of annual examinations believe that viola-
tions will be nonetheless detected by the Department given responsibil-
ity for policing the Act, the result being a great savings in time and
expense devoted to bookkeeping and examinations.
2 7 0
To aid the Department in the administration of the CFA, each
licensee is required to keep records in accordance with accepted ac-
counting principles 271 and submit an annual report stating its financial
position.27 2 The CFA provides a five dollar per day penalty for unjustifi-
ably delinquent annual reports.72
In addition the Department is given the power to issue regula-
tions,274 which are promulgated by order. A copy of every order
promulgating a regulation must be mailed to every licensee at least
fifteen days before its effective date.
275
XIII. CONSUMER CREDIT COUNSELING
Many of the financial problems of the credit minded consumer stem
from a lack of understanding of money management and fiscal sound-
ness. In times past, even those who had a basic understanding of such
matters were unable to protect themselves in many instances because
of the hidden credit charges, unusual methods of stating rates of in-
terest, and other devices, such as balloon payments, which seemingly
were utilized just to foster confusion. The Federal Truth in Lending
Act, which requires the disclosure of basic credit information in all
269. Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 53, 64 (1969).
270. The National Commission on Consumer Finance computed the number of man-
days per loan office each state consumer credit administrator had available per year to
examine consumer finance companies. The median figure was 2.64 man-days available per
office. CONSUMER Carr IN THE U.S. 56. Florida's man-day calculation was 2.63. Id. at 78.
"[T]he Commission recommends that legislatures and administrators in states with less than
2 1/2 man-days available per year per small loan office reassess their staffing capabilities
with the goal of improving their ability to fulfill the examination responsibility pre-
scribed by law." Id. at 56.
271. FLA. STAT. § 516.12(1) (1971) (unchanged by CFA).
272. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 6 (§ 516.12(2)).
273. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 6 (§ 516.12(2)).
274. FLA. STAT. § 516.22(1) (1971) (unchanged by CFA).
275. FLA. STAT. § 516.22(2) (1971) (unchanged by CFA).
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consumer credit transactions, has given these persons access to the in-
formation they need to operate on a sound basis. But for those who do
not know the fundamentals of money management, the disclosures
would have little meaning, except perhaps in comparing one "im-
propriety" with another. To assist these persons to become more pro-
ficient in their money matters, consumer education and counseling is
a must. In this light, the National Commission on Consumer Finance
has recommended "expanded treatment of consumer credit at both the
junior and senior high school levels."2 76 Furthermore, "state agencies
should continue their emphasis on adult education for low income con-
sumers, should try to reach more of them, and should develop useful
programs for the elderly."2 7 7 Hopefully, statewide programs emphasiz-
ing consumer education will be implemented in the near future for
the state of Florida.
To date, industry and its regulators have been more active in the
consumer education field than educators. Many Florida banks have al-
ready set up counseling services pursuant to "requests" from the Comp-
troller's office, and with the passage of the following provisions in the
CFA, small loan companies are likely to follow this example.
The department shall be responsible for promoting a consumer
credit counseling service for the purpose of promoting and helping
establish consumer credit counseling services for individuals in areas
where a need has been established. The purpose of the consumer
credit counseling service shall be to:
(1) Assist and educate individual consumers as to money manage-
ment.
(2) Assist individual consumers in consolidating obligations when
a situation exists where the individual consumer is in need of such
assistance; and
(3) Work with consumer credit grantors in an effort to establish
better relations with the individual consumer and with state and
federal regulatory agencies. 278
Even though the Act appears to be a directive to the Department,
through its rule making powers, the Department can pass the mandate
on down to the companies that it regulates.
276. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 195. Even though the passage of legislation estab-
lishing a required course on the high school level dealing with finance and credit practices
in Florida may be desirable, the National Commission on Consumer Finance has stated
that it is "preferable to delegate basic consumer education to curriculum areas of home
economics, business, and social studies" because of the broader coverage of pupils rather
than make mandatory a course in which the student may become disinterested. Id.
277. Id. at 197.
278. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 12 (§ 516.32).
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Pursuant to this new legislation, there are plans to encourage
licensees to set up their own individual programs, and to establish a
series of free seminars for interested consumers. One plan that has al-
ready been carried into effect is a consumer "hot line." The Depart-
ment has installed a statewide, toll free WATS line which will be open
twenty-four hours a day for the purpose of answering consumer ques-
tions about the institutions within the Department's authority.2 9
It is commendable that someone has undertaken the task of con-
sumer credit education, but it is questionable whether such advice will
be free of industry bias and self-interest. It is difficult to imagine
creditors telling their customers that they cannot afford any more
credit at this time or that the best course of action at this point may be
bankruptcy.280 A solution to this problem was offered by the National
Commission on Consumer Finance in its recommendation that
business organizations support and encourage nonprofit credit coun-
seling provided it is conducted for the benefit of the consumer and
does not serve solely or primarily as a collection agency.28 '
279. Tallahassee Democrat, Aug. 23, 1973, at 21, col. 6. The Department has authority
in the areas of banking, state savings and loans, finance, retail credit cards, retail install-
ment buying, mortgage banking and brokers, credit unions, trading stamps, copyright
music, cemeteries, and securities registration and investigation.
280. Consider, for example, the following statement:
Adler, California Creditors Lend Hand to Debtors Facing Bankruptcy, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 1967, at 76, describes Consumer Credit Counsellors, a service in Los
Angeles whose board includes representatives of creditor interests, and such inter-
ests are among its important contributors. Its manager is a former employee of
various creditor interests. The article describes the organization as one "to combat
the soaring bankruptcy rate. . . . to help deeply indebted people help themselves
avoid bankruptcy; to arrange pro-rata plans for orderly debt settlement in cases
where individuals need assistance in carrying out extended payment plans .... "
In other words, these programs encourage debtors to continue paying their debts
on a slower scale, instead of wiping out the debts through discharge in bankruptcy.
The Adler article concludes: "The loan sharks are smiling ambivalently. They
are attempting to save today's suckers for another slaughter tomorrow."
H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT 330 (1970).
281. CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE U.S. 199.
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